

## **Globalization and the transformation of the national political space<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Introduction**

The political consequences of the process of globalization are manifold. On the one hand, this process leads to the formation of new channels of political representation at the supranational level and opens up new opportunities for transnational, international, and supranational political representation and mobilization (Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999). On the other hand, these same processes have profound political implications on the national level. National politics are challenged both “from above” – through new forms of international cooperation and through a process of supranational integration – and “from below,” at the regional and local level. These consequences of globalization have most often been studied at the supra- or transnational level. Here, by contrast, we shall focus on the national level. It is a paradox of this process of change that the political reactions to economic and cultural globalization are bound to manifest themselves at the national level. Hence nation-states and national politics do not lose in significance. But they are likely to undergo a process of fundamental change.

Our research focuses on the case of Western Europe, where “denationalization” means, first of all, European integration. For the present argument, however, this aspect of the European context is not essential. Europeanization and European integration can be seen as special occurrences of a more general phenomenon.

Michael Zürn suggests to view the process of globalization as a process of “denationalization” (Beisheim, Dreher et al. 1999; Zürn 1998), as a process that leads to the lowering and the “unbundling” of boundaries of nation-states (Ruggie 1993). This process has already begun in the 1950s. It is neither linear, nor automatic or self-reproducing. But this process has accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s (Zürn 1998). Following David Held and his collaborators (Held, McGrew et al. 1999: 425), who have probably presented the most detailed and

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measured account of the phenomenon in questions, we may argue that “in nearly all domains contemporary patterns of globalization have not only quantitatively surpassed those of earlier epochs, but have also displayed unparalleled qualitative differences – that is in terms of how globalization is organized and reproduced.” From a Rokkanean perspective, we may conceive of the contemporary opening up of boundaries as a new “critical juncture,” which is likely to result in the formation of new structural cleavages, both within and between national contexts.

These are the central ideas of a research project in which we are currently involved. In this paper, we shall present in more detail our expectations regarding the formation and articulation of new political cleavages, and see how much these are conditioned by contextual features. In the next section, we discuss how the process of denationalization leads to the formation of a new conflict, opposing “winners” and “losers” of the process of globalization. This conflict creates a potential for processes of political mobilization within national political contexts. We shall then examine how this potential can be articulated at the level of political parties. In order to understand how new political cleavages may result from the process of denationalization, it is crucial to focus not only on transformations in the electorate (the demand side of electoral competition), but to consider also which strategies political parties follow, and how they can benefit from these new potentials (the supply side of politics). The third part of our presentation deals with variations between national political contexts. The transformation of national politics depends not only on processes at the supranational level, but is also conditioned by specific contextual characteristics. A noticeable feature among these is the salience of the traditional political cleavages. Finally, in the last section of this paper, we present some preliminary results of our research project, focusing on the Swiss context.

### **A new structural conflict between losers and winners of globalization**

Three assumptions guide our analysis. First, we consider that the consequences of globalization are not the same for all members of a national community. They give rise to new disparities, to new oppositions, and to new forms of competition. Second, we assume that citizens perceive these differences between the “losers” and the “winners” of globalization, and that these categories are politically articulated. Last, we expect that these new oppositions do not overlap with the traditional social and political cleavages.

The “losers” of globalization are those citizens whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat

for their social status and for their social security. Their life chances and their action spaces are being reduced. The “winners,” on the other hand, are those categories of people who can benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced. The essential criterion for determining the impact of the opening up of national boundaries on individual life chances is whether or not someone possesses *exit options*. As Zygmunt Baumann has observed (1998: 9), *mobility* becomes the most powerful stratifying factor. There are those who are mobile, because they control convertible resources allowing them to exit, and there are those who remain locked-in, because they lack these resources. The question of the structural changes induced by globalization is a point of controversy. It is widely debated in political science and in sociology (see for example Beck 1997, 1998a, 1998b). However, we can identify three mechanisms which contribute to the formation of winners and losers of globalization. First among these is the increase in economic competition, which results from the globalization process. In the last years, a series of transformations in the American economy have resulted in a massive pressure towards deregulations in west European countries, leading in turn to a dramatic erosion of protected property rights. Herman Schwartz (2001) considers globalization to be primarily this erosion of property rights that were politically protected, and of the streams of income anchored in them. The individuals and the firms which are most directly affected by this erosion are those who worked in “sheltered” sectors, i.e. sectors that were, since the 1930s, sheltered from market pressures through public regulation.<sup>2</sup> Those measures disconnect income streams (in the form of wages, employment, or profits) from the outcome of the market. Schwartz’s distinction between sectors sheltered from the market, on the one hand, and sectors exposed to the market, on the other, has much in common with the distinction between export-oriented firms and firms oriented towards the domestic market.<sup>3</sup> With the international pressure towards deregulation, the cleavage between these two sectors intensifies. Firms exposed to market pressures try to impose market disciplines on traditionally sheltered sectors, so as to

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<sup>2</sup> Such measures include: „trade protection, minimum wages, centralized collective bargaining, product market regulation, zoning, the delegated control over markets to producer groups, and [...] formal welfare states“ (Schwartz 2001: 31).

<sup>3</sup> Schwartz emphasizes however the difference between the two classifications. Considering them as equivalent is misleading, he argues, because few commodities or services are not subject to international trade. Furthermore, he considers the stranded investments of the “sheltered” sectors to be a central problem, which is different from the issue of the opportunity costs of the export-oriented sectors. For a similar argument, see Frieden (1991: 440): „The principal beneficiaries of the broad economic trends of the last two decades have been internationally oriented firms and the financial services industries; the principal losers have been nationally based industrial firms“; and Frieden and Rogowski (Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 46): “... exogenous easing of trade will be associated with increased demands for liberalization from the relatively competitive, and with increased demands of protection from the relatively uncompetitive, groups”

bring down their own costs of production and to remain competitive on the international market. Firms in sheltered sectors, by contrast, seek to defend their property rights. Workers in exposed sectors also have an interest in the lowering of production costs, as their jobs directly depend on the international competitiveness of their firm. Workers in sheltered sectors, by contrast, have the same interest in protectionist measures as their employers have. Globalization thus leads to a *sectoral* cleavage, which cuts through the traditional class cleavage.

Increasing immigration into Western European countries represents the second mechanism, which leads to an increase in *cultural* competition. In the immigration countries, ethnically different populations become symbols of potential threats to the collective identity and to the standard of living of the natives. Furthermore, with the opening up of national borders, the European nation-states have been granting expanding social rights and privileges – though no political rights – to the migrants (Soysal 1994: 130), which increases the perception of competition on the part of the native population. However, this potential cultural threat is not perceived and experienced in the same way by all members of a national community. In this respect, individuals' educational level plays a central role. Education has a "liberalising" effect, i.e. it induces a general shift in political value orientations toward "libertarian" claims. It contributes to cultural tolerance and openness; it provides the language skills which give access to other cultures. Individuals who are poorly educated are usually less tolerant and they do not have the resources to communicate with foreigners or to understand other cultures in a more general sense (Lipset 1963). Furthermore, they are more often confronted to immigrants than individuals with a higher educational level are, as they are often in direct competition with them on the labour market. Finally, higher education has also become an indispensable asset for one's professional success. It provides the necessary specialized skills which are marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing one's exit options. It is certainly true that this evolution is less a consequence of globalization than of the process of deindustrialization and of technological change. But from the point of view of the affected groups, it is central to understand how they *perceive* the relative loss in their life chances and to which factors they assign it.

A third mechanism related to the opening up of borders increases the *political* competition between nation-states, on the one hand, and supra- or international political actors, on the other. Nation-states lose part of their autonomy of action. Most scholars agree, for example,

that the possibilities of an independent macro-economic policy have been drastically reduced through the liberalization of the capital market. This is obvious in the European context, where an autonomous monetary policy is no more possible since the creation of a European central bank. These changes also create winners and losers in specific ways. First of all, there are material losers, insofar as the reduction of a State's autonomy implies a reduction of the size of its administrative apparatus. But, more importantly, winners and losers also result from differences in their *identification with the national community*. Gorenburg (2000) has emphasized the importance of such identifications to understand support for nationalism. Individuals who possess a strong identification with their national community and who are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a weakening of the national political institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with universalist norms will perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of supranational political institutions.<sup>4</sup> The attachment to national traditions, national languages, and religious values plays here a prominent role – as does the integration into cosmopolitan (transnational) individual networks.<sup>5</sup>

Let us summarize our argument up to this point: To the likely winners of globalization belong entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan and open citizens. Losers of globalization, on the other hand, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who feel closely bound to their national community. Following the realistic theory of groups conflicts, we consider that the threats perceived by the losers and the related attitudes do have a real basis. They are not simply illusions or rest on false representations. Furthermore, we assume that individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as distinct phenomena<sup>6</sup>. As Martin Kohli (2000: 118) argues, identity and interest are mutually reinforcing factors of social integration.

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<sup>4</sup> For the distinction between norms of exclusion and universalist norms, see Hardin (1995: chapters 4 and following).

<sup>5</sup> Traditionally, integration into cosmopolitan networks was the preserve of a small elite. Today, however, the Jet Set is not the only group which is forming transnationally and which is developing identities that rival with territorially more circumscribed identities (Badie 1997: 453f.).

<sup>6</sup> Bobo (1999: 457): "... the melding of group identity, affect, and the interests in most real-world situations of racial stratification make the now conventional dichotomous opposition of 'realistic group conflict versus prejudice' empirically nonsensical".

### **The political articulation and organization of the new structural conflict**

The new groups of winners and losers of globalization constitute in turn *political potentials*, which can be articulated. However, given the heterogeneous composition of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions on which domestic politics have traditionally been based. This makes it difficult for national political actors to organize these new potentials. Furthermore, the composition of the groups of winners and losers varies between national contexts, making it even more difficult to organize them at the supranational level, e.g. at the level of the European Union. This constitutes a paradox of globalization: this process creates new political potentials, which, due to their heterogeneity, can only be articulated and dealt with at the level of the national political process. If the hypothesis is correct that we are facing a new critical juncture in the historical development, which creates a new type of structural antagonism, then we may expect that these transformations lead to a basic restructuring of the configuration of collective political actors in the different national contexts.

We thus suggest that, paradoxically, the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries render them more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, the importance of national boundaries increases. More specifically, the destructuring of national boundaries leads to a “sectorialization” and an “ethnicization” of politics (Badie 1997), i.e. to an increased salience of differences between sectors of the economy and of cultural differences, respectively, as criteria for the distribution of resources, identity formation, and political mobilization. As far as the ethnicization of politics is concerned, the theory of ethnic competition holds that majority groups will react to the rise of new threats with *exclusionary measures* (Olzak 1992). At a general level, we would expect losers of the globalization process to seek to protect themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on national independence. Winners, by contrast, who benefit from the increased competition, should support the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. We shall refer here to this antagonism between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between *integration* and *demarcation*.<sup>7</sup>

In order to discuss the political articulation of this new structural conflict, it is useful to specify it in two ways. First, we should distinguish between an *economic* dimension and

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<sup>7</sup> Bartolini (2000) refers to it as a conflict between integration and independence.

*social-cultural* dimension of the integration/demarcation divide. On each of these two dimensions, we can further distinguish between an open, integrationist position, and a defensive, protectionist position. In the economic domain, a neoliberal free trade position is opposed to a position in favour of protecting the national markets. In the social-cultural domain, a universalist or multiculturalist position is opposing a position in favour of protecting national culture and citizenship in its civic, political, and social sense. The orientations on the two dimensions need not necessarily coincide – and empirically, they are only loosely related.

Second, the notion of integration needs to be clarified. More integration may simply mean the removal of boundaries and other obstacles to free and undistorted international competition – that is purely *negative integration* in Scharpf's terminology (1999: 45). By contrast, integration may also refer to what Scharpf has called a process of *positive integration*, i.e. a process of reconstruction of a system of regulation at the supranational level. Scharpf has introduced these concepts with respect to the economic dimension, but one can also apply them to the cultural side: “negative integration” in cultural terms would simply mean cultural dedifferentiation – a cultural homogenization, possibly in the direction of an Americanization or of the expansion of the Western way of life and Western political ideas across the entire world.

“Positive integration” would mean the introduction of a system of regulation at the supranational level that allows for the peaceful coexistence of a multicultural society. In the European context, it could also mean the creation of a distinctively European identity and a European political community, which may coexist with lower level territorial identities and communities.

Combining these two elements, we arrive at a nine-fold typology of possible positions with regard to the integration/demarcation divide (Table 1). This typology presents the range of possible interpretative packages or master-frames which are available to political entrepreneurs for the articulation of the new structural antagonism. In Table 1, some possible combinations are also suggested.

New structural conflicts put the established political organizations (parties, interest groups) under pressure. They are the product of former social, economic, and cultural conflicts. If they do not succeed in adapting their programmatic offer to the new situation, they face the risk that new political actors (parties, interest groups, or social movements) mobilize specific segments of the electorate on the basis of the new social conflict. We must therefore begin our

analysis by considering how established political actors react to these new potentials. We focus here on political *parties*. In spite of the increasing importance of national and transnational social movements, political parties still have a key position for the articulation and organization of political interests, and for the recruitment of the political personal.

Table 1: Typology of general orientations with regard to the integration/demarcation divide

Cultural dimension	Economic dimension		
	Positive integration	Negative integration	Demarcation
Positive integration	<i>New Left</i> - supranational regulation - supranational identity formation/ multiculturalism	<i>Third Way</i>	<i>Communist Left</i> - economic protectionism - multiculturalism
Negative integration		<i>Neoliberalism</i> - no barriers to competition - cultural homogenization	
Demarcation		<i>New radical Right (winning formula)</i> - economic liberalism - cultural defense	<i>New radical Right</i> - economic protectionism - cultural defense

The *mainstream political parties* have so far taken a rather undifferentiated position with respect to the new cleavage. They seem to be uncertain because (i) they are internally divided as regards the question of integration, (ii) they are divided as Euro-families as a result of their variable insertion into national party configurations, and (iii) they are not in a position to form a strong alliance between different sectoral and cultural interests. As a result, mass attitudes do not get clearly structured by mainstream political parties. Broadly speaking, however, whether on the left or on the right, the mainstream parties tend to view the process of economic denationalization both as inevitable and beneficial for the maintenance of their established positions. Thus, analyzing the main party families – the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats – at the EU level, Hix (1999) has noted that, between 1976 and 1994, all three gradually converged on moderately pro-Integration positions.

As a first hypothesis, we would thus suggest that, in Western Europe, 1) mainstream parties will tend to formulate winners’ programmes, i.e. programmes in favour of further economic and cultural integration and that 2) mainstream parties on the right will tend to favour “negative integration,” while mainstream parties on the left will tend to support steps in the



direction of “positive integration.” This hypothesis implies that “left” and “right” are not outdated concepts. It rather suggests that the new dividing line – similarly to the conflict between authoritarian and libertarian values (Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi 1998a) – will be integrated into the left-right division, which, in the process, will again be transformed. One attempt to come to terms with the problems posed by the new dividing line is the “Third Way,” formulated by the British Labour Party. Anthony Giddens (1998: 26) describes it as “a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to adapt social democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the past three decades.” The concept of the Third Way provides a particular focus for debates in other national contexts as well, especially in Germany (see Giddens 2000). Two aspects are central to all versions of Third Way politics: 1) the socio-cultural aspect of reconceptualising the ideas of community, nation, and citizenship (civic, political and social) in a globalizing world, and 2) the repositioning of the left with respect to the neoliberal economic programme. Third way politics takes globalization seriously, adopts a positive attitude towards it, and seeks to combine a neoliberal endorsement of free trade with a core concern with social justice (Giddens 1998: 64ff.). For the architects of the Third Way, taking globalization seriously also requires steps in the direction of “positive integration,” in the form of global economic governance, global ecological management, regulation of corporate power, control of warfare and fostering of transnational democracy (Giddens 2000: 122-162).

The indecision of the mainstream political parties and their tendency to moderately opt for the winners’ side suggest a second guiding hypothesis: we face an *increasing political fragmentation* (Zürn 2001), with the strengthening of peripheral political actors, who tend to adopt a losers’ programme. Peripheral actors on the right are *culturally* more protectionist, and peripheral actors on the left are *economically* either more protectionist or more positively integrationist than their respective mainstream counterparts. Thus, analyzing the Euroscepticism of political parties in different European countries, Taggart (1998) found that it is the more peripheral parties (on both sides of the political spectrum), rather than parties more central to their party systems, which are most likely to use Euroscepticism as a mobilizing issue.

Most importantly, however, it is the movements of the *new radical right* which have found an ideological package that appeals to the interests and fears of many of the losers of globalization. The main characteristics of this new radical right are its *xenophobia* or even racism, expressed in its opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western Europe, and its *populist appeal* to the widespread resentment against the mainstream parties and the dominant

political elites. The new radical right is clearly defensive on the socio-cultural dimension. At the same time, it is populist in its instrumentalization of sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment as well as in its appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense. It builds on the losers' fears with regard to the removal of national borders, and on their strong belief in simple and ready-made solutions. This "national-populism" constitutes the common characteristic of all organizations of the Western European radical right. However, their ideology sometimes also includes *neoliberal elements* (Betz 1993): some of them advocate individual achievement, a free market-place, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state. Kitschelt (1995) points out that not all radical parties on the right share this element, but he insists that the most successful ones among them do. According to Kitschelt, this combination constitutes the "winning formula," which allows these parties to forge electoral coalitions including both their declining middle-class clientele and the losers from the unskilled working class.<sup>8</sup>

The success of this formula of the radical right has a strong appeal for established parties on the right as well, and it contributes to the right's deconstruction. The rise of the Austrian FPÖ and of the Swiss People's Party illustrates this point. In both cases, an established party of the right radicalized and adopted a programme combining national-populist elements with neoliberal ideas. In other words, these parties combine social-cultural protectionism with economic liberalism. With their economic liberalism, they mainly oppose to the national state and its increasing role in domestic society. But, in addition, they also turn against any attempt to introduce supranational controls of national politics. However, the liberalism of these radicalized parties of the established right is not opposed to negative integration, i.e. to the removal of barriers to free trade and integrated financial markets. This specific mixture of liberalism and xenophobia constitutes a new form of *social Darwinism*, the rule of the strong, which attempts to preserve their countries' advantageous economic position for their indigenous populations against all political and other interferences from the outside.

On the *left*, we also find more peripheral political actors defending the losers, although with less success than the radical right so far. The *old communist left*, where it still exists, tends to be economically, but not necessarily culturally protectionist. The French Communists and the French Mouvement des Citoyens (dissident socialists led by Jean-Pierre Chevènement) have,

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<sup>8</sup> More recently, however, Kitschelt (2001: 435) suggests that some right-authoritarian parties (like the FPÖ in Austria or the Front National in France) have moderated their neoliberal appeals and have focused more on the themes of a reactive nationalism and of ethnocentrism.

for example, campaigned against the Maastricht treaty in 1992, but they have also fought against racism and the Front National (Szarka 1999: 25-28). The *New left*, i.e. the Greens, the remnants of the new social movements of the seventies and eighties, and a new type of transnational social movements have rather come to accept the phenomenon of globalization and to mobilize for “positive integration,” economically (e.g. Tobin Tax) and culturally (e.g. extension of human rights’ regimes). Democratization of supranational regimes and subordination of economic integration to social, cultural and political controls are the keys to their programme (Ayres 2001: 56). They provide the red thread linking the euroscepticism of the radical left (Taggart 1998) to the mobilization of the SMOs against the supranational organizations, of which the large demonstrations against the G8 summits of Genoa in 2001 and of Evian in 2003 constitute only the last links in a longer chain. In 1988 already, very large crowds protested against the IMF and World Bank congress in Berlin (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). In 1994, the radical left mobilized again against the World Bank’s anniversary meeting with a “Fifty Years is Enough” campaign and forced a rethinking of the Bank’s goals and methods (The Economist, December 11, 1999: 18). In 1998, an ad hoc coalition of activists helped to sink the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The mobilization against the WTO in Seattle also left its imprint: the economic and political elite which met at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2000 was visibly shaken by the events that had taken place in Seattle and by the renewal of the protest on site (NZZ, Nr. 27, February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2000: 19).

If on the right, the winning formula appears to be a combination of economic liberalism (i.e. negative integration) with cultural protectionism, on the left, the winning formula may be a combination of moderate economic liberalism with full support for positive integration – socially, culturally and politically. The outcome of the restructuring of the political space is however largely open. It may take different forms, depending (i) on the adaptative capacity of the established political actors, (ii) on the mobilizing capacities of the new political actors, and (iii) on characteristics of the national political context. We discuss the latter point in greater detail in the next section.

### **Contextual variations in the restructuring of the national political space**

The extent to which this new cleavage will restructure the national political space in a given country depends on the existing political context. Most importantly, this will depend on the *relative strength of the traditional cleavages and the new cleavage* (Bartolini and Mair 1990;

Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995). The stronger the relative strength of the traditional political divisions, the smaller is the capacity of the new division to destructure the national political landscape. To put it simply: in a country, such as Northern Ireland, where entrenched religious conflicts predominate domestic politics, the new division between “winners” and “losers” will only play a subsidiary role. In such a situation, the new division will be instrumentalized by the opponents of the traditional conflict, but it will hardly be able to restructure the political space. According to this hypothesis, there is a zero-sum relationship with regard to the strength of the traditional and of the new cleavages. For the same reason, we would also expect individual-level differences *within* national contexts: the stronger the integration of citizens in traditional political organizations like parties, trade-unions, associations, but also in churches and confessional organizations, the more difficult it will be to mobilize them on the basis of the new structural conflict.

The level of economic development should also play a prominent role as regards contextual variations. In economically highly developed countries, we would expect the new cleavage to be particularly strong, because the traditional class cleavages tend to be pacified, but also because the economic opportunities in such countries tend to attract migrants from the less developed parts of the world. This, in turn, increases ethnic competition in the country and leads to defensive reactions on the part of the native population. Moreover, the more highly developed a country is and the more privileged its citizens are, the more likely it is that any form of supranational regulation will imply the sharing of some of the national economic advantages with less privileged populations.

For less economically advanced countries, by contrast, opening up may constitute the opportunity to catch up economically, socially and politically. Thus, the countries of the European South look to European integration in the hope that through the process of integration, domestic problems can be solved which they have been unable to solve by themselves in their post-war history (Haller 1999: 274). European integration may serve to strengthen their economy and their democratic institutions. For Eastern Europe, Turkey and the South of the Mediterranean, the opening up towards Europe may serve the same purpose. This should attenuate the new cleavage in such countries. Similar phenomena may be observed between different regions within a given nation-state. For example, the new cleavage is arguably much stronger and politically more consequential in the North of Italy than in the South of the country, as is suggested by the rise of the Lega Nord.

The impact of the level of economic development may be modified by the *tradition of economic openness* of a national context. In this respect, small European countries have a

long tradition of economic liberalism and integration into world markets (Katzenstein 1985). They have followed strategies to compensate, at the national level, for the negative consequences of this integration. These strategies imply not only an expansion of the welfare state, but also measures that are specifically designed to protect those sectors of the economy which are oriented towards the domestic market. Such measures were especially important in the “liberal-conservative” variant of democratic corporatism, which characterizes Switzerland, among others (Mach 2001). With the globalization process, this kind of compensatory strategies is strongly put under pressure, what leads to the creation of a strong potential of losers in a country like Switzerland.

The *economic situation* of a country and the *number of immigrants* also impact on the development of the new cleavage. On the basis of Eurobarometer data, Quillian (1995) has shown that racial prejudice against minority groups increase with perceived threats to dominant national groups. Perceived threat, in turn, is a function of economic conditions and of the size of the minorities. Prejudice against immigrants and racial minorities increases with the size of these groups and with economic recession.

The impact of the opening up of boundaries may also be modified by the *social-cultural heritage*, which is above all reflected in the conceptualization of a country’s political community, nationhood and citizenship. We may distinguish between at least *three models of citizenship and nationhood*: the “differentialist” or “ethnic” model, the “universalistic” or “republican” model, and the “multicultural” model. They differ sharply from one another with respect to their openness and integrative capacity (see, e.g. Koopmans and Kriesi 1997). We may expect the different models to have diverging implications for the development of the new cleavage. The ethnical and republican models, which emphasize the cultural differences between the natives and the immigrants, are more likely than the multicultural model to contribute to a reinforcement of the new conflict.

The new cleavage is likely to be particularly explosive in economically highly developed countries which combine a tradition of economic liberalism with a tradition of socio-cultural closure. This creates a tension that is difficult to resolve if the opening up of boundaries concerns not only the economic ones, but also the political, cultural, and social boundaries. Such a combination is characteristic of Switzerland and of the Belgian region of Flanders. In both cases, the polarization on the question of international integration is also particularly strong.

The form and outcome of this process of restructuring of the national political landscape also depends, of course, on the *national political institutions*. *Institutional access* is obviously a major determinant of the form of the transformation. Political systems which, as a result of their majoritarian institutions and of the exclusive strategies of their major actors, do not allow an easy institutional access, risk a radicalization of the process of restructuring and a high level of conflictuality. Political systems with institutions that allow for extensive sharing of political power, by contrast, are more likely to experience a peaceful and gradual transformation. Similarly, we expect a substitutive relationship between the integrative capacity of established actors and the level of radicalization of the process.

The *rise of new actors* is much easier in consensus-democratic systems than in majoritarian ones. In consensus democracies, they not only benefit from easy access to institutions (e.g. because of proportional representation or multilevel governments), but also from the collusive arrangements among the established parties and the social partners typical of such democracies. Grand coalitions, for example, are conducive to the mobilization of new actors on the left and on the right. Thus, the early success of the German neo-fascist NPD in the late 1960s was in large measure a reaction against the grand coalition formed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the SPD. Once competitive party politics were re-established between the CDU and SPD, the NPD disappeared from the scene. Similarly, the radical right seized its opportunity in the small Western European countries that follows the pattern of Lijphart's (1999) "consensus democracy" most closely: Haider's Liberal Party (FPÖ) benefited tremendously from its opposition against the "Lager" mentality in Austria (Plasser and Ulram 2000); the Vlaams Blok mobilized against the complicated "pillarised" structure in Belgium (Billiet 1998: 189; Billiet and Swyngedouw 1999: 168); and the Swiss People's Party openly turned against the "consociational" composition of the Swiss government.

Finally, the restructuring of the national political space is also conditional on the kind of boundary removal or boundary building that will be chosen. In the European context, much depends on the shape that the European Union is going to take and on the political opportunities for the structuring of political alternatives at the European level. Bartolini (2000: 11f.) suggests that the process of European integration in particular contributes to a destructuring of the domestic cleavages and party structures on the one side, but constitutes only a weak and improbable basis for an effective process of structuring of political alternatives at the higher EU level. This is even truer of the global level, where the equivalent

of a national political community is very largely absent. By default, it is still the nation-state which constitutes the context for the structuring of political alternatives.

### **Research design**

In the previous sections, we have presented the central ideas and hypotheses of a research project we are currently involved in. We shall not make here an extensive presentation of our research design, but only mention a few salient aspects. These should help to make it even clearer how we conceive of the formation of a new structural cleavage, and how its emergence can be empirically analysed. We consider six Western European countries: Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands. They present interesting variations regarding most of the central theoretical aspects discussed above. We have three large and three small countries – the latter being characterized by their traditional integration into world markets and by their compensatory strategies. Furthermore the three large countries are typical cases of each of the three models of citizenship: the ethnical (Germany), republican (France), and multicultural (Britain) models. Amongst the small countries, only the multicultural type is not represented.

The criterion of the size is also closely related to the criterion of the model of democracy. The smaller countries are closer to the consensual type, while the large ones rather correspond to the model of a majoritarian democracy. Germany, however, with its federalist structure and with its strong power-sharing on the parties-executive dimension, is also to be ranked among the consensual democracies (Lijphart 1999). These countries also differ from one another regarding their relationship to the EU. Germany, France, and the Netherlands belong to the founding generation and to the driving forces of the Union. Britain and Austria joined the EU later, and are still characterized by a rather high level of euroscepticism. Finally, Switzerland is not a member of the EU.

The focus of our comparative analysis lies on national elections. As a matter of fact, we consider that national elections still represent a crucial moment for the structuring of national political contexts.<sup>9</sup> We shall analyse elections of the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as one electoral contest in each country in the 1970s, as a point of reference in a period in which national politics was not yet structured by globalization. As far as the demand side of the electoral process is concerned, we rely on post-election surveys. They will allow us to identify

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<sup>9</sup> National elections are more appropriate than European elections, as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1995).

the social-structural basis of party choice, and to see how sharply winners and losers of globalization diverge in their political orientations and in their party preferences. This analysis will be completed by an examination of the supply side of electoral competition. To this end, we perform a content analysis of newspapers coverage, television news, and political advertisements, during the electoral campaign. The aim of this analysis is to determine which issues political parties have highlighted, and which positions they have taken.

In this paper, we shall only present some preliminary results, pertaining to the Swiss case. As we are still in the phase of data collection, we cannot yet present results for all six countries. Switzerland, however, is a good example, with its highly consensual system and its tradition of integration into world markets. Furthermore, even if it is not a member of the European Union, the issue of European integration has been very high on the political agenda in the 1990s. It was even one of the most important factors as regards the structuring of party competition.

Switzerland is also an interesting case with respect to the strategies adopted by its main political parties. Thus, it presents a prominent example of an established political party adopting in the 1990s a programme combining populist appeals and neoliberal elements. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) and his charismatic leader Christoph Blocher have been very successful in the elections of the 1990s. They strongly supported a *demarcation strategy* on the cultural dimension (clearly opposing an adhesion to the EU and advocating, among others, a tightening of the asylum policy and a limitation of the number of foreigners). On the economic dimension, they often take a *neoliberal position*, urging for a reduction of the state's expenditures, for a lowering of taxes, and for more concurrence and more deregulation. However, they still favour protectionist measures and the intervention of the state in some economic domains – especially as regards the agricultural sector, which used to be the core electoral segment of this formerly agrarian party. Thus, the SVP is close to Kitschelt's "winning formula" – though it is not as neoliberal as the ideal-type.

The other major parties on the right, the Christian Democrats (CVP) and the Liberals (FDP) are in a more difficult position. The CVP, especially, has seen its share of votes in national elections being strongly reduced. It was almost as strong as the FDP and as the Socialists in the 1970s, receiving about 21% of the votes. This proportion has been continuously declining since then, and the Christian-Democrats could mobilize only about 14% of voters in the elections that were held last October. They present a typical case of a centre party, which has not succeeded in mobilizing new segments of the electorate. As a consequence of the ongoing



secularization process, its core electorate has been shrinking. The Liberals have also become weaker in the 1990s. They face a strong concurrence from the SVP, who presents itself as *the* party of the economy and of the bourgeois right – a position that was formerly clearly occupied by the Liberals. They also support a reduction of the size of the state and also take neoliberal positions. However, they clearly reject the SVP's populist strategy and are more supportive of the integration of Switzerland into Europe. On this last point, however, their position is not without ambiguity. They support the government's strategic goal of an EU adhesion, but only as a long-term perspective.

The left parties are dominated by the Socialists (SP). They have also been among the winners in the last elections, along with the SVP, leading thus to a stronger polarization of the Swiss party landscape. The SP takes a position which is close to the one of the New Left in the typology we have presented above. On the cultural dimension, they clearly favour a strategy of positive integration, supporting the adhesion of Switzerland to the EU, and taking rather libertarian positions on most issues of social policy. And as regards the economic dimension, they still follow a clear leftist strategy, opposing any reduction of the size of the welfare state and withstanding the attempts of the right to cut down on taxes.

### **The transformation of the political space: supply side**

We start our analysis by considering the supply side of electoral competition. To this end, we rely on data on the issue positions of political parties during electoral campaigns. These data were gathered with the help of a content analysis of two major Swiss daily newspapers (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, a quality newspaper, and *Blick*, a tabloid). For each of the four electoral campaigns that we analyse (1975, 1991, 1995, and 1999), all articles related to the electoral contest or to politics in general have been considered, during the two months before Election Day.

The headlines and the first paragraph of these articles were coded *sentence by sentence* using a method developed by Jan Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder and Rietberg 1997; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). The aim of this method is to code every relationship between “political objects” (i.e. either between two political actors or between a political actor and a political issue). For the present purpose, we are only interested in relationships between a political actor and a political issue. The direction of each of these “core sentences” was quantified using a scale ranging from -1 to +1 (with three intermediary positions). Political actors were coded according to their party membership (summarized into four party families: Left, Centre, Liberal Right, Conservative Right), and political issues were

grouped into the 13 following categories (we indicate in brackets the abbreviations we use to refer to these categories)<sup>10</sup>:

- Support for the welfare state, expansion of the welfare state [welfare]
- Reduction of the state's deficit, cut on expenditures, less taxes, NPM [budget]
- For more domestic concurrence, for economic deregulation [liberal]
- Support for exportations, support for free-trade, defence of Switzerland's competitiveness [export]
- Support for democracy, defence and extension of direct democracy [democracy]
- Environmental protection [env.]
- Support for education, culture, and research [culture]
- Support for the army, in favour of a strong national defence [milit.]
- For more law and order, fight against criminality [security]
- For a strengthening of the asylum policy, against immigration [asylum]
- Support for the international integration of Switzerland, for international cooperation (does not include European integration) [open]
- For the integration of Switzerland into Europe, for the adhesion of Switzerland to the EU [europe]
- Defence of Swiss traditions and of traditional values [trad]

These categories are formulated in such a way that they always have a clear direction. If an actor supports the adhesion of Switzerland to the EU, for example, his relationship to the category 'europe' will take a positive value (+1). If, by contrast, a party advocates an increase in the state's expenditures, its relationship with the category 'budget' will be negative (-1). Such data offer valuable information on two central aspects of the supply side of electoral competition: the *positions* of political parties regarding the various political issues, and the *salience* of these issues for a given political party. The position of an actor for a group of issues is computed by averaging over all core sentences which contain a relationship between this actor and any of the issues belonging to this group. The salience of a group of issues refers to the frequency with which a given political party takes position on this group of

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<sup>10</sup> In the original dataset, the coding of actors and issues is done at a much more precise level. We code political actors according to their party membership, their political function, and their name. And as regards issues, we distinguish between over 200 different categories. For the purpose of the present analysis, however, we have recoded our data into more general categories.

issues.<sup>11</sup> It is important to understand that both are relevant to an adequate description of the political space. Parties do not only differ from each other with respect to the positions they advocate, but also with respect to the priorities they set.

On the basis of these data, it is possible to construct a graphical representation of the positions of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space, using the method of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a very flexible method that allows representing graphically information on similarities or dissimilarities between pairs of objects (Borg and Groenen 1997; Cox and Cox 2001; Kruskal and Wish 1978). In our case, the issue positions of parties give us information on the “similarity” or “distance” between a group of parties and a group of issues. If a Left party, for example, strongly supports an expansion of the welfare state, then we would expect the distance between this party and the category “welfare” to be small. Thus, if we represent the parties and issues in a common space, this Left party and the category “welfare” should be located close to each other.

Furthermore, a variant of MDS, called Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling (WMMDS), allows to account simultaneously for the *similarities* between pairs of objects (parties and issues, in our case) and for the *salience* of these relationships.<sup>12</sup> This means that, when representing our data in a low-dimensional space, the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be more accurate than the less salient ones. Distortions of “real” distances are unavoidable. But with WMMDS, these distortions will be smaller for more salient relationships, resulting in a more accurate representation of the relative positions of parties and issues.

Our central interest here lies in the transformation of the parties’ positions. We want to let the positions of parties vary over time while keeping the dimensions of the political space constant. To this end, we have performed a WMMDS by computing the distances between parties and issues separately for each election. We have thus 29 “objects” to be represented in our political space: the 13 categories of issues and 4 positions for each group of parties (one for every election year). The resulting configuration is displayed in figure 1.<sup>13,14</sup> The 13 issues

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
<sup>11</sup> The positions of the parties on the different categories of issues and the corresponding saliences can be found in the appendix, in tables A1 to A4.

<sup>12</sup> Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling can be estimated using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS.

<sup>13</sup> A two-dimensional representation is most appropriate in this case: The value of the normalized raw Stress statistic decreases substantially when the number of dimensions is increased from 1 to 2 (-0.03). But adding

are represented by their abbreviations. The political parties in 1975 are also represented by their name (Left, Centre, 'LibR' for liberal right and 'ConR' for conservative right), followed by the number 75 – so as to clearly identify to which election these points refer. The positions of the political parties in the subsequent elections are denoted by circles, and the different positions of a party are connected by a line. This makes it easier to follow the evolution of their position over time. Last of all, the figure also contains two dashed lines, to which we shall come back very soon.

Figure 1: Results of the MDS analysis



In the lower left corner of the figure, we find the group of Left parties. Their position has not changed much between 1975 and 1999. And in all four elections, they are close to the categories of environmental protection and of the welfare state. The position of this group of parties can also be interpreted with regard to the issues that are very far from it. We thus see that parties on the Left are strongly opposed to further liberalizations (both as regards the domestic economy and support for free trade), a tightening of asylum policy, the defence of traditional values, and a strong army.

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more dimensions results only in marginal changes of this statistic (-0.005 from 2 to 3 dimensions; -0.000 from 3 to 4 dimensions).

<sup>14</sup> The goodness-of-fit of the proposed solution is not optimal (Stress-1 takes a value of 0.34). However, we can be confident that a two-dimensional solution is appropriate (see the previous footnote). The number of points (29) is also much higher than the number of dimensions (2), what inevitably leads to a higher Stress. Furthermore, we have checked that our solution is not a local minimum, by estimating the model with a very high number of different starting configurations.

On the right part of figure 1, we find the group of conservative parties. They have changed their position much more markedly. Between 1975 and 1991, they have sharply moved towards the right side of our figure, coming thus closer to the categories of liberalism and (anti-)asylum. This change moves them also further away from the defence of the welfare state and of the international integration of Switzerland. In the most recent elections, their position has changed again and they are now situated close to the defence of Swiss traditions, of a strong army, and of a strict budget policy. On the other hand, they are most distant from the issues of European integration and of the welfare state.

In the upper part of the graph, we find the group of Liberal parties. Up to the 1995 election, these parties have not changed their position dramatically. They support the cultural and educational policy, the international integration of Switzerland, and encourage lower barriers to free-trade. Between the 1995 and the 1999 elections, by contrast, they have come much closer to Conservative parties. This shift in their position is quite impressive. They are now close to the defence of traditional values and are more likely to advocate a strong reduction of taxes and of the size of the State. They have also moved away from the issue of European integration.

Last of all, we turn to Centre parties. The evolution of their position seems to reflect some indecision. In the 1970s, they were very close to the Liberal Right. In the early 1990s, however, their position is much closer to the one of the Left. In the next two electoral campaigns, yet, they have moved back towards their original position.

The dimensions resulting from an MDS analysis (i.e. the horizontal and vertical axes in figure 1) are not substantially meaningful. As a matter of fact, the solution can freely be rotated, as the only relevant information is formed by the distances between the objects. Yet, by considering how the different issues are positioned relative to each another, we can try to identify axes that are substantially meaningful and that could help us to identify an underlying structure. To this end, we have traced two dashed lines in figure 1, which represent a possible interpretation of these results. It must be emphasized that these additional axes are not a product of the MDS analysis itself. We have simply located them on the basis of our own interpretation of the configuration. The first of these axes, which runs from the lower left to the upper right corner, corresponds in our view to the traditional left-right divide. It opposes support for the welfare state and for environmental protection, on one side, to liberalism and free-trade, on the other. The second axis, by contrast, can be interpreted as an opposition between integration and demarcation, or between “openness” and “tradition.” It opposes

support for the integration of Switzerland into Europe, on one extreme, to the defence of traditions and of a strong army, on the other.

With the help of these additional axes, changes in parties' positions become much easier to interpret. Left parties have not modified their preference regarding the role of the State in the economy. However, their position has become more pro-integrationist. It may actually seem surprising that they did not become even more so. This is due to the composition of the group of Left parties. It is dominated by the Socialists – but also includes smaller parties (Greens, Workers' Party) which are more reluctant to adopt a clear pro-integrationist position.

Parties on the right, on the other hand, have become more liberal on the economic dimension (Conservative Right) and especially more supportive of a demarcation strategy (Liberal and Conservative Right). Only the Centre parties have not fundamentally changed their location. These evolutions point to a polarization of the Swiss party system. First, the distances between Left and Right parties have become much larger. Second, they take more extreme positions on the openness/tradition axis.

The additional axes we have drawn on figure 1 also help to illuminate some unusual combinations of issues. We can thus observe that the categories 'anti-asylum' and 'liberalism' are located close to each other. Similarly, the defence of traditions lies very close to the defence of a reduction of the State's size. Such configurations may seem surprising. However, they give precious insights to understand which form the restructuring of the party system takes. Thus, the small distance between liberalism and anti-asylum shows that some issues of the new cultural antagonism, which have become more salient with the globalization process, are already being integrated into the traditional left-right divide. In the same vein, the closeness between the defence of traditions and a strict budgetary policy – a combination typical of the New Radical Right – indicates how strong the influence of neo-populist parties is on the contemporary structure of the party system. This particular combination of liberalism and protectionism has been emphasized by Betz (2003) as characteristic of the New Right.

### **The transformation of the political space: demand side**

In the previous section, we have seen how the structure of the party system had changed since the 1970s. This is however only one face of the problem and it is now time to turn to an analysis of the *demand side* of electoral competition. To this end, we rely on post-electoral

surveys that were conducted after the 1975, 1995, and 1999 elections.<sup>15,16</sup> In order to compare the positions of voters with the position of parties, we need to construct a representation of groups of voters in the political space. As a matter of fact, all three electoral studies considered here contain a large set of variables pertaining to voters' political values and issue positions. These relate both to the traditional left-right divide and to the antagonism between "openness" and "tradition" – the two main axes that structure the political space of parties, as we saw it above. Thus, the first step in our analysis is to see whether these two dimensions also structure the preferences of voters. An appropriate way to do this is to rely on a factor analysis of these issue positions and value orientations. In 1975, we can use the following set of items:

- Do you prefer an economy based on the market or an economy regulated by the State? (10-point scale)
- Is Switzerland governed by a few big interests, or according to the interests of most people? (dummy variable)
- Are incomes in Switzerland distributed equitably? (dummy variable)
- Importance of evening out differences in wealth (4-point scale)
- Postmaterialism index (4-point scale)
- Did the respondent support the 1974 popular initiative of the extreme right? (dummy variable)
- Importance of guaranteeing equal rights for foreign workers (4-point scale)
- Importance of guaranteeing equal rights for men and women (4-point scale)
- Should Switzerland join the European Community? (3-point scale)
- Should Switzerland join the UNO? (3-point scale)

In 1995 and 1999, we have a list of nine questions, that pertain to voters' general political orientations. Respondents had to express their preferences on the following contrasts (all items are five-point scales):

- A strong army or the suppression of the army
- Raise or cut down social expenditures
- Join the European Union or not

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<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, the variables available in the 1991 election study are not sufficient to perform such an analysis. We do not have enough information on voters' issue preferences and on their social class membership.

<sup>16</sup> The 1975 Swiss election study was part of the international project "Political Action: An Eight Nation Study". The sample includes 1254 individuals, who were interviewed face-to-face. The national samples of the 1995 and 1999 studies include 1981 and 2048 cases, respectively. These two studies were based on telephone interviews. All three datasets are available through the Swiss Data Archive (SIDOS, [www.sidos.ch](http://www.sidos.ch)).

- Equal chances for foreigners or better chances for Swiss citizens
- Defend or reassess Swiss traditions
- Give much importance or little importance to law and order
- Environmental protection or economic growth
- Increase or decrease taxes on high incomes
- For or against nuclear energy

As the items are the same in 1995 and 1999, it makes sense to perform a single factor analysis for these two elections. This enhances the comparability of our results. The factor loadings are presented in tables 2 and 3.<sup>17,18</sup> In both cases, the interpretation of the resulting factors is straightforward. In 1975, six variables load highly on the first factor: postmaterialism, support for the initiative of the extreme right, attitudes towards equal rights for foreign workers and towards equal rights for men and women, and finally, preferences regarding the European Community and the UNO. All of these items pertain to the contrast between integration and demarcation. The second factor by contrast, is dominated by the economic issues: the contrast between the State and the market, whether a few big interests dominate Swiss politics, and voters' attitudes towards the equity and equality of the incomes' distribution.

The structure resulting from the factor analysis is thus clear. Furthermore, turning to table 3, we can notice that the results of the two more recent surveys are similar. Here, again, the first dimension is structured by preferences towards cultural issues (EU adhesion, equal rights for foreigners, opinion on Swiss traditions, law and order), and the second one by attitudes towards economic issues (social expenditures, environmental protection vs. economic growth, taxes on high incomes). It should be emphasized, however, that voters' attitudes on the army load highly on both factors<sup>19</sup>, and that issues pertaining to environmental protection (nuclear energy and the contrast between ecology and economic growth) are related to the second dimension. This last aspect shows that the issues emphasized by the Greens have been integrated into the traditional left-right divide.

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<sup>17</sup> In the analysis of the 1995 and 1999 data, only two factors have an eigenvalue larger than 1. In the 1975 case, however, we have limited the analysis to two factors.

<sup>18</sup> Respondents who did not vote in the election have been excluded from the analysis. All variables are coded so that a high value indicates a preference for the market or for a demarcation strategy, respectively. For each variable, missing values have been replaced by a middle position.

<sup>19</sup> This is due to the long-standing pacifism of the Socialists, on the one hand, and to the opposition to the army of the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s (especially of the Peace Movement).



Table 2: Rotated factor loadings (after a varimax rotation), 1975 election

	1 <sup>st</sup> factor	2 <sup>nd</sup> factor
State vs. market	-0.04	0.58
Is Switzerland governed by a few big interests?	-0.09	0.51
Equity of the income's distribution	-0.02	0.66
Important to even out differences in wealth?	0.17	0.61
Postmaterialism	0.50	0.00
Initiative against foreigners	0.57	-0.17
Equal rights for foreign workers	0.68	0.06
Equal rights for men and women	0.58	0.03
Switzerland and EC	0.43	0.15
UNO	0.39	0.29
Eigenvalue	1.83	1.46
Variance explained	18.4%	14.6%

Table 3: Rotated factor loadings (after a varimax rotation), 1995 and 1999 elections

	1 <sup>st</sup> factor	2 <sup>nd</sup> factor
EU adhesion	0.73	-0.01
Equal rights for foreigners	0.71	0.07
Defend Swiss traditions	0.76	0.08
Law and order	0.65	0.18
Strong army	0.63	0.40
Raise social expenditures	0.31	0.53
Environmental protection vs. economic growth	0.18	0.58
Taxes on high income	0.00	0.71
Nuclear energy	0.10	0.66
Eigenvalue	3.05	1.27
Variance explained	33.9%	14.1%

These results offer two important conclusions. First, they show that the dimensions underlying voters' attitudes are stable over time, and that they correspond to the axes which structure party competition. Second, and maybe more interesting, they reveal that the cultural dimension was already salient in the electorate *before* the polarization of the party space along this dimension. In 1975, the contrast between openness and tradition was already the main dimension structuring voters' attitudes. It was however not yet clearly articulated by established political parties.<sup>20</sup> This finding is crucial. It shows that the issues linked with globalization were already structuring voters' attitudes before they structured party competition.

This gap has to do with the relationship between old and new issues. As we have argued above, the conflict between "winners" and "losers" of globalization does not overlap with the

<sup>20</sup> Such issues were however articulated by the extreme-right in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A popular initiative aiming at a severe limitation of the number of foreigners in Switzerland was supported by a strong minority of the population (46%) in a ballot in 1970. Far-right parties (Republicans and National Action) obtained their highest score in a national election in 1971 (7.7%).


traditional, economic opposition between the left and the right. It is only through a mobilization process on the side of political parties and through a realignment of some social groups that this new dimension can come to structure *electoral competition*.

To show this, it is useful to examine how the positions of the parties' electorates have changed. In figure 2, we have represented the average position of the supporters of the four governmental parties (Socialists, Christian-Democrats, Liberals, and Swiss People's Party), and of two additional groups of parties (the Greens, and far-right parties). The left panel of figure 2 shows their position in 1975, the middle panel in 1995, and the right panel in 1999. The horizontal axis of these figures is the economic divide (i.e. the second factor from the analyses above), whilst the vertical axis is the cultural opposition (i.e. the first dimension of the factor analyses), with positive values indicating a preference for demarcation and negative values for integration. In 1975, there were only small differences between these groups of voters as regards the cultural dimension. Only the supporters of the agrarian party diverge somewhat from the other voters, with a position favouring demarcation. On the "state-market" dimension, by contrast, the differences are much more marked: SP voters are on the left, supporters of the CVP take a centrist position, and the voters of the two other bourgeois parties have a preference for more market.

If we compare this with the configurations of the 1995 and 1999 elections, the differences are striking. A strong polarization has taken place on the vertical dimension. Socialist voters are still supportive of the role of the State in the economy – but they now also clearly take a pro-integrationist position. Green voters are even more on the left and in favour of a strategy of integration, thus reinforcing the polarization of the political space. On the other side of the political spectrum, the important change regards SVP supporters. This segment of the electorate has, on average, become more favourable to a demarcation strategy.


These changes in the profile of the SP and SVP voters lead to a different political space. Voters are now polarized among both dimensions. The potential observed in 1975 is now also reflected in differences between supporters of the various parties. Once parties have begun to mobilize voters on the basis of new issues, these have led to strong differences between electoral groups. This result shows how crucial it is to consider the organizational level of a political cleavage. A potential for the new cleavage was already present in the 1975 election – but this new dimension was cutting across the traditional economic divide. Thus, it did not imply large differences between the supporters of the four governmental parties.

Figure 2: Positions of the parties' electorates in the political space



Note: the parties' electorates are denoted by the following symbols: SP: Socialist Party, CVP: Christian-Democratic Party, FDP: Liberal party, SVP: Swiss People's Party, G: Greens, EXR: Extreme-right parties.

Figure 3: Positions of social classes in the political space



Note: the social classes are identified by the following symbols: F: self-employed farmers, SE: other self-employed, UW: unskilled workers, SW: skilled workers, R: routine non-manual workers, T: technical specialists, M: managers and administrative specialists, SC: social-cultural specialists

To better understand how this phase of realignment and mobilization can take place, it is helpful to look at the evolution of voters' positions from a different angle. Following the arguments we have presented before, an important criterion to explain preferences towards the new cultural divide is voters' position within the employment structure. Some professional categories largely benefit from the opening up of borders, while others have more to lose. To this end, we rely on a class schema based on insights from Kriesi (1993; 1998b) and Müller (1998; 1999). We distinguish between the following employment categories (we indicate in parentheses the abbreviations used below in the graphical representation): self-employed farmers (F), other self-employed (SE), unskilled workers (UW), skilled workers (W), routine non-manual employees (R), managers and administrative specialists (M), technical specialists (T), and social-cultural specialists (SC).

The evolution of the positions of these social categories is presented in figure 3. As in the previous figure, the horizontal axis is the economic factor and the vertical axis is the cultural one. This figure reveals several important evolutions:

- *Workers* (both skilled and unskilled) have become more opposed to integration or more “authoritarian” in Kitschelt’s terminology. Thus, while they used to be a core electoral segment of the Socialist Party, they move increasingly *away* from this party. The SP has become more pro-integrationist. But workers, on average, have more to lose from such a strategy. It is thus not surprising that a growing proportion of them turns now to the populist right and supports the SVP.
- *Social-cultural specialists* are another core component of the socialist electorate. Their position in the political space has almost not changed: in 1975 already, they were clearly in favour of an integrationist strategy, and supportive of the role of the State in the economy.
- *Managers* and *technical specialists* have not much altered their position either. Managers are somewhat less in favour of an integration strategy than technical specialists. But the differences are relatively small.
- In 1975, *self-employed* respondents took a position close to the one of both technical and administrative specialists. Their profile has however changed much: they are now clearly supportive of a demarcation strategy. As a matter of fact, in 1999, their profile is quite similar to the preferences of skilled workers – two groups who had very different orientations in 1975.

- Finally, the evolution of the position of *routine non-manual employees* is more surprising. In 1995, they have a leftist profile which is difficult to explain. Following the characteristics of their occupations, we would expect them to be located somewhere between skilled workers and managers. Comparing only 1975 and 1999, however, we observe that they move slightly towards an integrationist strategy.

Altogether, these results offer some strong support for our expectations. The occupational categories which have most to loose from an opening up of borders (both groups of workers, routine non-manual employees, and the self-employed) have changed their preferences. They are now much more in favour of a demarcation strategy. Members of the new middle class, by contrast, remain as before supportive of a strategy of integration.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper we have presented a theoretical argument linking globalization with the formation of a new structural cleavage within national contexts. The opening up of national boundaries creates both “winners” and “losers.” The winners of globalization are citizens who can benefit from new opportunities, while the losers are those who see their life chances and social status threatened by this process. We have identified three mechanisms who contribute to the formation of this new cleavage.

First, globalization leads to an increase in *economic competition*. The growing pressure towards deregulation reinforces an antagonism between sectors of the economy which were traditionally sheltered from market pressures through public regulation, on the one hand, and sectors which are exposed to the market, on the other hand. Employees and firms in sheltered sectors seek to defend their privileged position and to remain insulated from international competition. Firms in export-oriented sectors, by contrast, have an interest in expanding market disciplines to all sectors of the economy, in order to bring down their own production costs. Then, immigration into Western Europe leads to a process of *cultural competition*. Some segments of the population perceive this immigration as potential threat to the collective identity and to their economic status. In this respect, an important stratifying factor is one’s educational level. Finally, the opening up of boundaries also increases *political competition*, between nation-states and supra-national political actors. The limitation of the nation-states’ autonomy is rejected by citizens who feel strongly attached to their national community.

These mechanisms create a potential for a new political cleavage. This potential, however, must be articulated by political actors. The strategies available to political parties can be specified on their *cultural* and *economic* dimension. On both dimensions, parties can follow a strategy of demarcation, a strategy of negative integration, or a strategy of positive integration.

Finally, we have suggested that several contextual factors influence the extent to which national politics will be restructured by this new cleavage. Most noticeable among these is the relative strength of the new cleavage and of the traditional social cleavages. The opposition between winners and losers of globalization will not be the basis for a strong mobilization if the traditional cleavages are still salient. Furthermore, the capacity of this new conflict to structure national politics should also depend, among others, on the level of economic development, on the extent of immigration, on countries' social-cultural heritage, and on institutional features.

In the second part of our presentation, we have analyzed the transformation of the political space in Switzerland, between the 1970s and the 1990s. As regards the *supply side* of electoral competition, we have shown that political parties are increasingly polarized on an integration/demarcation axis. As far as the *demand side* is concerned, we have found that voters' attitudes are structured by an economic dimension and by a cultural one. This structure was already present in the 1970s, but it was not yet articulated by the major political parties. As parties began to integrate the new cultural issues into their programmatic offer, however, their electorates have taken more differentiated positions on this second dimension. This change in the profile of the parties' supporters is a consequence of a realignment process of social classes. Occupational categories which are most directly threatened by the opening up of borders have become more favourable to a demarcation strategy, and they increasingly turn to Conservative parties.

## Appendix

In tables A1 to A4, we indicate the average positions of the four groups of parties on the 13 categories of issues that we have used for the MDS analysis. The data for each election are presented separately. The ‘Position’ of a party refers to the average direction of the coded sentences for the corresponding group of issues. The ‘Salience’ indicates the frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of this category, during an electoral campaign.

Table A1: Average positions of parties and salience of issue categories in the 1975 campaign

	Left		Centre		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience
Welfare	0.85	19.42	0.00	7.02	0.47	15.45	-1.00	7.41
Budget	-0.07	13.59	0.67	21.05	0.14	20.00	0.78	16.67
Liberalism	-0.92	12.62	1.00	1.75	0.20	4.55	-1.00	1.85
Export.	-0.57	6.80	0.00	1.75	0.67	5.45	-1.00	3.70
Democracy	1.00	2.91	0.29	12.28	0.28	16.36	0.60	9.26
Environment	0.80	4.85		0.00	-0.14	6.36	1.00	7.41
Culture	-0.20	4.85	0.89	15.79	0.67	10.91	1.00	16.67
Military	0.03	15.53	0.00	8.77	-0.60	4.55	1.00	3.70
Security	-1.00	1.94	0.43	12.28	0.82	10.00	1.00	14.81
Anti-asylum	-0.33	5.83	1.00	1.75		0.00		0.00
Openness	0.59	10.68	0.83	10.53	1.00	3.64	0.60	9.26
Europe		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
Tradition	-1.00	0.97	-0.25	7.02	-0.33	2.73	0.40	9.26

Table A2: Average positions of parties and salience of issue categories in the 1991 campaign

	Left		Centre		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience
Welfare	0.82	15.36	0.75	17.57	0.19	6.05	-0.10	7.55
Budget	-0.07	17.79	-0.29	5.86	-0.02	12.56	0.42	6.47
Liberalism	-0.57	7.55	-0.14	2.93	0.87	14.42	0.75	5.76
Export.	0.33	1.62	1.00	0.42	1.00	7.44	0.69	5.76
Democracy	0.83	1.62	1.00	2.51	1.00	1.40	1.00	1.08
Environment	0.96	14.02	0.58	16.32	0.22	8.37	0.02	16.19
Culture	0.40	2.70	0.00	0.84	-1.00	0.47	-0.50	1.44
Military	-0.75	9.16	-0.45	4.60	0.64	5.12	0.67	6.47
Security	-1.00	1.08	0.89	3.77	0.60	2.33	1.00	2.52
Anti-asylum	-1.00	7.55	0.89	10.46	0.60	8.84	1.00	20.86
Openness	0.86	3.77	0.50	1.67	0.60	4.65	0.33	1.08
Europe	0.20	9.97	0.51	16.74	0.38	17.67	-0.55	11.87
Tradition	-0.24	7.82	-0.10	16.32	0.17	10.70	0.56	12.95

Table A3: Average positions of parties and salience of issue categories in the 1995 campaign

	Left		Centre		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience
Welfare	0.90	22.91	1.00	8.62	0.00	7.89	-0.18	16.96
Budget	-0.05	11.17	0.11	15.52	0.27	17.11	0.65	15.18
Liberalism	-0.60	8.38	0.17	10.34	0.71	9.21	1.00	7.14
Export.	0.00	1.12	0.25	6.90	1.00	7.89	0.50	3.57
Democracy	0.70	2.79	1.00	1.72	1.00	3.95		0.00
Environment	0.83	23.46	0.50	20.69	0.25	5.26	0.75	1.79
Culture	1.00	0.56	1.00	3.45	1.00	1.32	-0.33	2.68
Military	-0.42	6.70	0.50	3.45	0.00	2.63	1.00	1.79
Security	0.50	2.79	1.00	1.72	1.00	5.26	1.00	1.79
Anti-asylum	-0.71	3.91	-0.33	10.34	0.14	9.21	0.57	12.50
Openness	0.78	5.03	1.00	3.45	1.00	3.95	-0.20	4.46
Europe	0.29	7.82	0.33	5.17	0.39	23.68	-0.54	20.54
Tradition	-0.33	3.35	0.60	8.62	0.00	2.63	0.69	11.61

Table A4: Average positions of parties and salience of issue categories in the 1999 campaign

	Left		Centre		Liberal Right		Conservative Right	
	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience	Position	Salience
Welfare	0.85	11.49	0.60	6.94	0.33	7.06	-1.00	2.30
Budget	-0.50	10.34	0.35	23.61	0.74	22.35	1.00	19.54
Liberalism	-0.63	17.24	0.17	8.33	-0.08	7.06	0.63	13.79
Export.	0.00	2.30	0.00	2.78	1.00	5.88	1.00	1.15
Democracy	1.00	3.45		0.00		0.00	1.00	3.45
Environment	0.97	18.39	0.25	8.33	0.00	7.06	0.30	5.75
Culture	0.50	8.05	0.96	19.44	0.06	30.59	-0.42	14.94
Military		0.00		0.00	0.00	2.35		0.00
Security	1.00	1.15	0.00	2.78	1.00	2.35	1.00	4.60
Anti-asylum	-0.73	12.64	0.69	11.11	0.68	12.94	0.56	10.34
Openness	1.00	4.60	1.00	13.89		0.00	0.50	4.60
Europe	1.00	5.75	1.00	2.78	1.00	2.35	-0.71	13.79
Tradition	-0.88	4.60		0.00		0.00	1.00	5.75



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