

Globalisation and the dynamics of issue voting in Western Europe¹

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Introduction

This paper analyses the impact of the issues linked with globalisation on the determinants on voting choices and on the main dimensions of electoral competition.² We argue that globalisation has important consequences at the level of national politics and that it leads to a reconfiguration of parties' positions and to a transformation of the dimensions or cleavages that have usually structured voters' choices. We analyse these evolutions in five countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK) by focusing on the impact of issues on the vote in national elections.

Globalisation can be conceived as a process of 'denationalisation' (Zürn 1998; Beisheim et al. 1999), as a transformation and weakening of national borders. These evolutions are not entirely new phenomena; they are earlier examples of phases of intense economic and cultural exchanges. However, such evolutions have accelerated in the last two or three decades and the 'actual phase' of globalisation surpasses both quantitatively and qualitatively those of earlier epochs (Held et al. 1999: 425). Most important for understanding the potential impact of this process on national politics is to see that its influence on citizens is not homogeneous. Some segments of a national community will benefit from new opportunities, while others will have more to lose and will perceive the changes associated with globalisation as a threat.

Globalisation leads to new oppositions, new disparities, and to the formation of groups of potential 'winners' and 'losers'. These new oppositions result from at least three forms of competition: economic, cultural, and political.³

First, at the *economic level*, globalisation is linked with a growing pressure towards deregulation. This leads to an opposition between different sectors of a national economy. Firms and employees in sectors that have traditionally been 'sheltered' from international competition by protectionist measures are opposed to firms and employees who are mainly

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² This paper is part of a research project on the consequences of globalisation for national politics, which is conducted jointly at the University of Zurich and at the Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, under the direction of Hanspeter Kriesi and Edgar Grande.

³ Our presentation of these new oppositions and of the characteristics of the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation is based on Lachat and Kriesi (2003) and Kriesi et al. (forthcoming), where these points are discussed in more detail.

oriented towards international markets. The latter favour deregulation as the weakening of national borders is beneficial to their international competitiveness, while it threatens the privileged position of the former on national markets. Second, globalisation is associated with immigration, which leads to a *cultural opposition*. Immigration and cultural diversity may be perceived by some citizens as a threat to their national or cultural identity and to their standard of living. Individuals' education level is most important for understanding how they perceive immigration. Citizens with a low level of education are not only in a more direct competition with immigrants on the labour market, but they also usually have less tolerant, less multicultural values. At the *political level*, finally, the most important evolution is clearly the process of European integration. The creation of a supra-national arena of decision-making and the increasing role of European-wide regulations is perceived as a loss by part of the citizens. Most important here is the degree of attachment to one's national identity. Those who feel strongly bound to their national community should perceive any weakening of the state's autonomy or sovereignty as a loss. Individuals with a more cosmopolite identity, by contrast, should be more favourable to this process – at least if it leads to the creation of a new system of regulation at the European level.

The impact of the new opposition on the structure of electoral competition

Economic, cultural, and political transformations linked with globalisation lead thus all three to new oppositions. They contribute to the formation of potential 'winners' and 'losers'. If these new oppositions are articulated by political parties, the structure of electoral competition should change and we should observe a process of realignment. If some parties try to mobilise segments of the electorate on the basis of issues linked with globalisation, we would expect a transformation of the issue basis of electoral choices and of the main dimensions that structure the political space. We have shown elsewhere that such a transformation could be observed at the level of the 'supply side' of electoral competition (Kriesi et al. forthcoming). Analysing the evolution of the structure of the national political space in six Western European countries, on the basis of parties' issue positions during national electoral campaigns, we have shown how the issues linked with globalisation have been integrated into the existing cleavage structure and how they have led to a transformation of the cultural dimension of electoral competition. In this paper, we want to analyse the consequences of these developments for the 'demand side' of electoral competition.

To better understand how globalisation may affect the determinants of voting choices and the structure of electoral competition, it is necessary to focus on the interactions between the new

issues linked with globalisation and the existing structure of party competition, as well as on the likely responses of parties with respect to the new challenges. Considering the interactions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ issue dimensions is central, because we do not expect the divergent interests linked with globalisation to simply form a new dimension of electoral competition that would be independent of the existing structure. The structure of party systems in most Western European democracies has traditionally been two-dimensional, with an economic and a cultural dimension (Budge et al. 1987; Cole 2005; Kriesi et al. forthcoming). They are the product of the traditional cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Of the four cleavages distinguished by these authors, which resulted from the National and Industrial Revolutions, the class and religious ones have been dominant in most Western democracies (Kriesi 1994). This structure was characteristic of the post-war period. It has however already been transformed, among others as a consequence of the mobilisation of the new social movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. Together with changes at the level of mass electorates – rising educational levels, secularisation, cognitive mobilisation, etc. – this has led to a process of ‘electoral dealignment’ and to a gradual transformation of the dimensions structuring national political spaces (Dalton et al. 1984; Inglehart 1990; Franklin et al. 1992). The most important evolution has been the transformation of the cultural dimension. From a dimension mainly based on the religious cleavage, it has changed to a dimension which has been labelled as ‘new politics’, ‘materialist-postmaterialist’ (Inglehart 1990), or ‘liberatarian-authoritarian’ (Kitschelt 1994). There has been some controversy on the exact nature of this transformed cultural dimension and on how it can be measured (see for example Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Duch and Strøm 2004). But despite these transformations, the structure of the party system remains two-dimensional (Kriesi et al. forthcoming). Similarly, we expect the emergence of issues linked with globalisation to lead to a transformation of the existing structure, rather than to the materialisation of a third dimension.

The result of this transformation process depends on the interplay between voters’ preferences and parties’ strategic reactions. This will determine which issues (‘old’ or ‘new’) are most important, how they are structured, and how they relate to electoral choices. As far as parties’ positions are concerned, the main difference should be between established parties of the moderate left and right, on the one hand, and more peripheral actors, on the other. Established parties usually take a positive, but moderate position towards globalisation (Lachat and Kriesi 2003; Kriesi et al. forthcoming). They favour further integration, both economically and culturally. This has been confirmed by several analyses of parties’ positions towards

European integration (Hix 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004): while there are differences across party families and across countries, the moderate left and right parties usually favour further European integration. Strong opposition to the EU comes from the radical left and from the radical or populist right. This does not mean however that established parties will take identical positions with respect to the national consequences of globalisation. Moderate left parties still emphasise social protection by the welfare state, while moderate parties on the right try to reduce more generally the role of the State. The interests of the ‘losers’ of globalisation are articulated by more peripheral political parties, both on the left and on the right. On the left of the political spectrum, parties of the radical left or some segments of social-democratic parties take a more defensive position on economic issues. They oppose any form of economic deregulation and advocate strong measures of social protection. While they are favourable to cultural liberalism and to the process of European integration, they may oppose specific steps towards a further integration if these are perceived to be too liberal economically or to present a danger for social protection at the national level. This is well illustrated by the strong opposition of the French radical left to the European constitution in the 2005 referendum campaign, or by the division of the Socialists on this issue. Similarly, in Switzerland, small parties of the radical left, as well as the Greens and some trade unions, were opposed to the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. Although they strongly support an adhesion of Switzerland to the EU, they rejected some of these agreements as they were perceived as a purely economic form of integration that would have lowered economic protection, employment market regulation, and standards of living. While parties of the radical left articulate the economic interests of the ‘losers’ of globalisation, it is the populist right which most strongly opposes cultural forms of integration. Opposition to immigration, an emphasis on national identity and on its norms of exclusion, and the defence of cultural protectionism, are central characteristics of their programmatic stance (Kitschelt 1995; Betz 2003; Bornschier 2005). On economic issues, by contrast, the position of the populist right is less clear-cut. Kitschelt (1995) has argued that the most successful parties of the populist right are those who combine an authoritarian position on cultural issues with economic neo-liberalism. However, he later emphasised that parties of the populist right had changed to a more moderate position on economic issues (Kitschelt 2001). It is first of all on cultural issues that they stand in a stark opposition to mainstream right-wing parties.

This transformation of the structure of the political space and the changes in parties' positions should directly affect the determinants of voters' choices. We shall focus here on the relationship between voters' issue positions and their party choice. Comparative analyses of 'issue' or 'value voting' often focus on the evolution of the general impact of values or issues (as opposed to structural variables, for example) or on the relative impact of 'new' vs. 'old' issues (see for example Franklin 1992; Knutsen 1995; Knutsen and Kumlin 2003). Analysing the evolution of the total impact of issue voting follows the hypotheses of the dealignment literature, according to which the weakening of the traditional cleavages and the process of cognitive mobilisation result in higher levels of issue voting (Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Our arguments, however, do not depend on a specific evolution of the impact of issues in general. It does not seem either in our case to be a good strategy to compare the relative impact of different groups of issues. Such comparisons have been made among others to find evidence of the emergence of a 'New Politics' dimension. The transformations linked with globalisation, however, should follow a different pattern. As a matter of fact, comparing the relative impact of 'old' and 'new' issues presupposes the emergence of an entirely new dimension of electoral competition. For this to be possible, however, two conditions have to be fulfilled. First, it must be possible to make a clear distinction between the 'old' issues and the 'new' ones (which are, in our case, those related to the national consequences of globalisation). Second, it requires that the purported new division is an entirely new one, which does not integrate 'old' issues. This does not correspond to the arguments we have presented above. Rather than the emergence of a new 'pro- vs. anti-globalisation' dimension, we expect a transformation of the existing cultural and economic dimensions. Also, while some issues like immigration or European integration may be dominant in the debate on the consequences of globalisation, it also affects voters' and parties' positions towards more traditional issues, like economic liberalism for example. Our analyses will be based on a different strategy. Rather than using broad aggregates of old and new issues, we consider more specific groups of issues, like the defence of the welfare state, cultural liberalism, or law and order. Furthermore, we do not consider the explanatory power of these issue categories in general, but focus on their impact party by party. We expect for example the defence of a restrictive immigration policy to play a central role in explaining support for parties of the populist right. This issue is one of the most important aspects of these parties' programmes and it expresses a restrictive position towards cultural integration. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that voters' attitudes towards immigration become more

important to explain voting choices *in general*, but only for the contrast between the populist right and moderate (left-wing or right-wing) parties.

Research design, data, and hypotheses

To analyse the transformation of the determinants of electoral choices, we consider national elections in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. In each country, we consider three recent elections of the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as one in the 1970s.⁴ This serves as a point of comparison to follow changes over a longer period of time. We always analyse elections of the Lower Chamber of Parliament, except in France, where we focus on the presidential elections, as these are the most important ones. However, in the period we consider, the first French election study made after a presidential election was the 1988 one. In the 1970s, we have to rely instead on the electoral survey that followed the 1978 legislative elections.⁵

In order to test general hypotheses about the impact of issues linked with globalisation on voting choices, we must be able to compare groups of parties and of issues across countries. This is central to the interpretation of our results and the solutions we have adopted need to be commented with some detail. As regards the dependent variables, we have formed groups of parties that are based on party families. It is not always possible to include all parties that compete in a given election, due to small number of observations. The number of parties or groups of parties that we distinguish in the analyses ranges from three to six, as presented in table 1. Some smaller parties are not included in our analyses, due to small numbers of observations or because they defend very specific interests and do not fit into any of the party families relevant for our argument.⁶

As far as issues are concerned, it is necessary to form groups of issues that can be compared across countries and over time. While some national election studies rely on standard sets of issue questions, allowing one to perform over-time comparisons, variations across countries in issue topics and question wording are too large to allow us finding strictly comparable variables. Instead, we have defined a number of issue categories, which we operationalise in

⁴ The elections we consider are the following ones: France: 1978, 1988, 1995, 2002; Germany: 1976, 1994, 1998, 2002; Netherlands: 1972, 1994, 1998, 2002; UK: 1974 (February), 1992, 1997, 2001. Switzerland: 1975, 1995, 1999. In the latter case, we can unfortunately consider only two elections in the 1990s. The range of political issues covered by the 1991 or 2003 election studies is too narrow for the present purpose.

⁵ The list of datasets used can be found in the appendix.

⁶ This includes regional parties (SNP, Plaid Cymru) and smaller parties in the UK, Orthodox Christian parties in the Netherlands (SGP, GPV, RPF), some minor candidates in France (de Villiers, Mouvement pour la France; Chevènement, Mouvement des citoyens; Saint-Josse, Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions; Lepage, CAP 21; Boutin, Forum des Républicains Sociaux), as well as minor parties in Switzerland and Germany.

Table 1. Groups of parties for the analysis of voting choices

	Radical left	Social- democrats	Greens, New Left	Christian- democrats	Conservatives	Liberals	Populist right
UK		Labour			Conservatives	Liberal democrats	
Netherlands		PvdA	GroenLinks ¹	CDA ²		VVD, D66 ³	LPF
France	PCF ⁴ , Trotskyist parties	PS, MRG ⁴	Verts		RPR	UDF	FN, MNR ⁵
Switzerland	- ⁶	SP	Greens	CVP, other small centre parties ⁷		FDP, LPS	SVP ⁸ , radical right ⁹
Germany		SPD	Greens	CDU/CSU		FDP	

Notes:

- 1 The parties that merged to form GroenLinks in 1990 (CPN, RPR, PSP, EVP) are already considered together before this date.
- 2 The parties that formed the CDA in 1980 (KVP, ARP, CHU) are already coded as CDA in the 1972 election.
- 3 Although both are liberal parties, VVD and D66 will be considered separately, as they represent distinct political positions.
- 4 In 2002, the Communist party is coded in the group of the Social democrats.
- 5 This group is not included in the 1978 analysis, due to a small number of cases.
- 6 Parties of the radical left cannot be considered in the analyses, as there are not enough observations.
- 7 Apart from the CVP, the following parties are coded in this category: PICS, LdU, EVP. The LdU (which does no longer exist) was not a religious party like the other three, but it took similar centrist positions.
- 8 In 1975, the SVP was not yet a party of the populist right. It will be coded under 'Conservative' for that election..
- 9 The parties of the radical right are the Freedom Party (FPS), the Federal Democratic Union (EDU), the Swiss Democrats (SD), and the Lega. These parties cannot be included in the analysis of the 1975 election, as there are too few of their voters in the survey.

each survey on the basis of the available issue questions. These ten categories are presented in table 2.⁷

The first three categories correspond to economic issues and thus to the traditional left-right dimension, resulting from the class cleavage. However, such dimensions cannot be reduced to ‘old’ issues. Part of the new challenges linked with globalisation are expressed or articulated in economic terms. Issues like market regulation or budgetary policy play an important role in the debate on the competitiveness of a state’s economy, for example. The next six categories, by contrast, refer to the cultural dimension. Most important for examining changes in the determinants of electoral choices are the questions of European integration and of immigration policy. These correspond most directly to the new challenges resulting from globalisation and form the core of the interests and fears of the ‘losers’ of globalisation in the cultural domain. Of course, they are not entirely new issues that would have appeared on the political agenda only in the 1980s or 1990s. But they have gained momentum in the recent period, especially due to the mobilisation of the populist right. We observe an increased polarisation of parties’ positions on these issues and they have become central to explaining the structure of party competition on the cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. forthcoming). We would thus expect to observe similar changes at the level of voters’ preferences.

Environmental protection, finally, cannot a priori be classified as economic or cultural. While it has been integrated into the traditional left-right dimension in many countries, its role in explaining voters’ choices may vary across countries, depending among others on the strength of the Greens.

On the basis of these issue categories, we can now explain more precisely how the expected changes should be reflected in the issue basis of voters’ choices. The contrast between Social democrats and moderate right-wing parties should be structured in all elections both by economic and cultural issues. The traditional economic issues (economic liberalism and welfare state), however, should be the most important ones. This reflects the traditional dominance of the left-right economic cleavage. As far as the cultural dimension is concerned, the most important issues in the 1970s should be those related to cultural liberalism and to the army, which correspond to the value conflicts linked with the religious cleavage, as well as to the aims of the new social movements of the 1970s (such as the peace movement), which have been integrated in the left-right opposition. In the 1990s, however, the impact of cultural

⁷ These categories were designed with the aim of analysing both the supply and the demand side of electoral competition. Some of them correspond to issues towards which political attitudes are only rarely measured in election surveys, but that may play an important role as far as parties’ positions are concerned, such as budgetary and cultural policies. The original scheme for coding issues contained two additional categories, ‘institutional reform’ and ‘infrastructural projects’, that are not relevant for the present analysis.

Table 2: Definition of the issue categories

Economic liberalism	Support for deregulation, for more competition, and for privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distinguishing criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors.
Welfare	Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment programs, health care programs. Valence issues such as ‘against unemployment’ or ‘against recession’ were dropped if there was no specification of whether the goal was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation.
Budget	Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures, reduction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution.
Cultural liberalism	Support for the goals of the new social movements, with the exception of the environmental movement: Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and Nato), support for the United Nations. Opposition to racism, support for the right to abortion and euthanasia. Opposition to patriotism, to calls for national solidarity, the defence of tradition and of national sovereignty, and to traditional moral values, support for a liberal drugs policy.
Europe	Support for European integration – including enlargement – or for EU-membership in the case of Switzerland.
Culture	Support for education, culture, and scientific research.
Immigration	Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the restriction of the number of foreigners.
Army	Support for the army (including Nato), for a strong national defence and for nuclear weapons.
Law and order	Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political corruption.
Environment	Support for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy.

Note: Based on Kriesi et al. (forthcoming).

liberalism should decrease and the questions of European integration and immigration should become more important. These issues should be marked by a strong contrast between the moderate left and right parties, on the one hand, and the populist right, on the other. Support for the latter group of parties should be strongly influenced by these new cultural issues and only weakly by economic attitudes. Altogether, in countries where a significant party of the populist right is present, we should observe the formation of three blocs – similar to the French *tripartition* emphasised by Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003a; 2003b). The moderate left opposes economic liberalism but favours cultural forms of integration (Europe, immigration); the moderate right favours both forms of integration (though it does so less strongly for cultural integration, especially in the case of Conservative parties); the populist right emphasises cultural protection and takes moderate economic positions. Further, among moderate right-wing parties, there should be differences between conservative and liberal parties, on the one hand, and Christian democratic parties, on the other. Support for the latter should depend more on cultural liberalism than on economic issues – at least in countries like Switzerland or the Netherlands where the Christian Democrats take a moderate position towards economic liberalism and are still mainly rooted in the traditional religious cleavage. These parties should thus take an intermediary position on the economic conflict between the left and other moderate right parties. Support for the Christian democrats should be also less strongly affected by the change in the ‘nature’ of the cultural dimension. Support for the Greens should follow a pattern similar to the one of the moderate left – but with a more pronounced impact of cultural issues (as well, of course, as of attitudes towards environmental protection). Finally, radical left voters (which we can consider only in France) should be more strongly opposed to economic liberalism than the Social democrats are, but should at the same time be less favourable to cultural integration, as radical left parties take a more defensive position, especially on the question of European integration.

For each of the ten issue categories, we have tried to find corresponding indicators in the different election surveys. When several issue questions related to the same category, we combined them using factor analyses. In this way, we could also check whether the indicators really measure a single underlying dimension. Constructing these issue variables is obviously a critical point of the analysis. There is no standard way of selecting the relevant indicators, combining them, or determining the correct dimensionality. We cannot, for reasons of space, present here in much detail the construction of these summary variables. However, the list of variables used for each issue category can be found in the appendix. The ‘rules’ and methods

we have used for operationalising the issue categories can be briefly summarised as follow. First, issue questions that did not correspond to any of our twelve categories were not considered, as well as questions which were either too general to be attributed to a specific category or were linked with political aims that may be attained by different means.⁸ When a single variable was available for a given category, we used it as our measure of voters' attitudes towards this issue group. When several variables were available, a principal-components factor analysis was performed, which resulted in most cases in a one-dimensional solution. When the factor analyses produced more than one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, we formed two separate variables for this issue category.

Of course, we did not have variables for all twelve issue categories in each survey. Table 3 indicates which of these categories we could operationalise for the fifteen election studies considered here. Two issue categories (budgetary policy and culture) appear only rarely. Questions pertaining to economic liberalism, cultural liberalism, European integration, immigration, law and order, and environmental protection, by contrast, are included in most surveys – with some national specificities, however. There are, for example, few indicators for preferences towards the welfare state in the Netherlands, towards economic liberalism in Switzerland, or towards environmental protection in France. Altogether, however, most issue categories are represented in a large number of surveys.

Results

As the dependent variable is always nominal (from three to six categories), all models were estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The models' coefficients, standard errors, and fit statistics are presented in the appendix (tables A.1-A.7). To make the interpretation of these results more straightforward, we focus here only on coefficients corresponding to key issues for the economic and cultural conflicts. These are economic liberalism (or welfare) for the economic dimension, cultural liberalism and national defence for the traditional cultural cleavage, and attitudes towards European integration and towards immigration for the new cultural conflict. Below, we analyse changes in the impact of these issues, focusing on specific contrasts between pairs of parties.

In the case of France, six groups of parties can be considered, of which only five are represented in the 1978 election. We focus here on three contrasts, between Social democratic and radical left parties, between the RPR and the Social democrats, as well as between the

⁸ Issue questions deemed too general, for example, are questions regarding 'solidarity' or 'equality' because they may be interpreted in different ways. Similarly, valence issues like fighting unemployment were not considered if the question did not specify the concrete measures by which these aims had to be reached.

Table 3: List of issue categories available for each survey

	UK				Netherlands				France				Switzerland			Germany			
	1974	1992	1997	2001	1972	1994	1998	2002	1978	1988	1995	2002	1975	1995	1999	1976	1994	1998	2002
Economic lib.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x
Welfare	x	x	x	x			x		x	x			x	x	x	x	x		
Budget		x	x		x				x										
Cultural lib.		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Europe	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
Culture													x			x	x		
Immigration			x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Army		x	x		x	x	x			x		x	x	x			x		
Law and order		x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Environment		x	x	x		x	x	x					x	x	x	x	x	x	x

populist right and the RPR. The corresponding coefficients are presented in table 4. In 1978, the contrasts between the radical left, the moderate left, and the moderate right, are structured by the traditional economic and cultural issues. Citizens who support economic liberalism are more likely to vote for the RPR than for the Social Democrats, and more likely to vote for the latter than for a radical left party. The impact of attitudes towards cultural liberalism follows an opposite pattern: citizens in favour of cultural liberalism are more likely to vote for the left than for the right. But these effects are weaker than those of economic attitudes. Among left-wing parties, both traditional cleavages have gradually weakened since the 1980s. In 2002, neither economic liberalism, nor cultural liberalism, has any significant effect on the contrast between the moderate and radical left.⁹ The choice between these two parties, however, depends on attitudes towards European integration. Radical left parties are thus not simply ‘more on the left’ than the Social Democrats, as they were in the 1970s.

The traditional cultural cleavage has also become less relevant for explaining the contrast between the moderate left and the moderate right. The impact of attitudes towards cultural liberalism has weakened since 1978, and was not significant in 2002. Here, however, attitudes towards Europe and immigration have no strong impact either. There is some evidence that supporters of the RPR are less pro European and more strongly opposed to immigration than moderate left voters. But these differences are much weaker than the differences in their economic orientations. The contrast between moderate parties remains thus mainly an economic opposition, which is only weakly affected by the new cultural issues. This is very different from the contrast between the populist right and the moderate right. Here, economic issues have only a small impact, while attitudes towards immigration have large effects. Altogether, we observe three types of oppositions in recent French elections: a strong economic conflict between left-wing and right-wing parties, a conflict over Europe between the radical left and moderate parties, and a conflict over immigration between the populist right and all other parties. This fits with our expectations about the transformation of the cultural dimension and the divide between moderate parties and more peripheral actors.

In the Netherlands, we focus on voting choices for four parties: the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Liberals (VVD), and the populist right (LPF). The regression coefficients for five issues and for three contrasts are presented in table 5. At first glance, the evolution of the impact of economic and cultural issues is quite similar to the

⁹ The change in the effect of cultural liberalism is not due to the inclusion of additional variables measuring cultural attitudes, towards European integration or immigration, for instance. In 1995 and 2002, cultural liberalism has no significant impact on this contrast, whether these additional variables are included or not.

Table 4. Regression coefficients for selected issues and contrasts, France

	1978	1988	1995	2002
<i>Social Democrats vs. Radical left</i>				
Economic liberalism	0.99***	0.48***	0.25**	-0.10
Cultural liberalism	-0.25**	-0.47***	-0.12	0.00
European integration			0.61***	0.47***
Anti immigration		-0.08	0.20*	0.14
<i>RPR vs. Social Democrats</i>				
Economic liberalism	1.12***	0.56***	1.04***	0.97***
Cultural liberalism	-0.55***	-0.34**	-0.29***	-0.16
European integration			-0.25***	0.00
Anti immigration		0.32**	0.27***	0.21
<i>Populist right vs. RPR</i>				
Economic liberalism		-0.22*	-0.24**	-0.21
Cultural liberalism		0.24	0.27**	-0.07
European integration			-0.40***	-0.33**
Anti immigration		1.19***	0.81***	1.15***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Regression coefficients from multinomial logistic regressions. The full results are presented in tables A.1-A.2.

French case: the economic opposition is the most important one for explaining the choice between the moderate left and the moderate right, traditional cultural issues have become less important, while the cultural issues linked with globalisation have become more relevant. This description fits quite well with the changes affecting the contrast between the VVD and the PvdA. In all elections, economic liberalism is the issue that has the strongest impact on the choice between these two parties. In the cultural domain, by contrast, the character of the most important issues has changed. The traditional cultural cleavage, reflected in the impact of cultural liberalism and of attitudes towards the army in 1972 and 1994, has been replaced by a conflict based on immigration policy. The VVD, however, differs on some important respects from the CDA, the other moderate right party. The Christian democrats take an intermediary position between the VVD and the PvdA on the economic dimension. This can be seen in the coefficients of the contrast between the CDA and the PvdA, which are significant, but lower than those of the VVD. Another important difference concerns the traditional cultural conflict. Voters who have a negative attitude towards cultural liberalism have a higher probability to vote for the Christian democrats than for the Social democrats, and this effect remains strong in all elections. There are no signs here of a weakening cleavage. This reflects the particular situation of Christian democratic parties, as mentioned above, who still emphasise traditional values and moral issues. The variables corresponding to the category ‘cultural liberalism’ in the Netherlands typically deal with issues such as euthanasia, traditional moral and values, patriotism, or respect for authorities. They are quite

Table 5. Regression coefficients for selected issues and contrasts, Netherlands

	1972	1994	1998	2002
<i>VVD vs. PvdA</i>				
Economic liberalism	1.06***	1.23***	0.93***	1.03***
Cultural liberalism	-0.28**	-0.11	0.03	0.00
Army	0.85***	0.31**	0.09	
European integration	-0.12	0.27*	0.05	-0.08
Anti immigration	0.17	0.31	0.37**	0.76***
<i>CDA vs. PvdA</i>				
Economic liberalism	0.59***	0.63***	0.41***	0.30**
Cultural liberalism	-0.41***	-0.81***	-1.09***	-0.62***
Army	0.69***	0.13	-0.18	
European integration	-0.19	0.11	0.18	-0.17
Anti immigration	0.25**	-0.21	-0.07	0.44***
<i>LPF vs. VVD</i>				
Economic liberalism				-0.47***
Cultural liberalism				-0.21
European integration				-0.26*
Anti immigration				0.94***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Regression coefficients from multinomial logistic regressions. The full results are presented in table A.3.-A.4

distinct from the issues associated with globalisation. The contrast between the populist right and the VVD, finally, is mainly influenced by attitudes towards immigration. There are thus strong similarities with the French case, as regards the general evolution of the main cleavages. But the particular profile of the Dutch CDA makes the configuration of cultural and economic divides more complex.

As mentioned above, only three elections can be analysed in Switzerland. We have distinguished five groups of parties. It must be emphasised that while the SVP is present in all elections, its ‘status’ has changed quite dramatically over time. In 1975, it was still a conservative party, mobilising its electorate first of all in the rural and protestant regions. In the 1990s it has gradually changed to a party of the populist right. In the corresponding elections, it is grouped with other small parties of the populist right. These parties were also competing in 1975 – but we have too few observations to include them as a separate category and it would not be appropriate to put them together with the SVP. Table 6 presents the regression coefficients for five groups of issues and for three pairs of parties.

The contrast between liberal parties and the social democrats shows again a strong and stable economic opposition. The corresponding attitudes are measured here with questions related to the welfare state – as attitudes towards economic liberalism have appeared only rarely in

Table 6. Regression coefficients for selected issues and contrasts, Switzerland

	1975	1995	1999
<i>Green vs. Social democrats</i>			
Welfare		-0.40*	-0.27
Cultural liberalism		-0.09	-0.35
Army		-0.42*	-0.46
European integration		-0.35	-0.37
Anti immigration		-0.45	-0.17
<i>Liberals vs. Social democrats</i>			
Welfare	-0.77***	-1.04***	-1.18***
Cultural liberalism	0.18	0.03	-0.30*
Army	0.22	0.83***	0.30*
European integration	0.34*	0.01	-0.26
Anti immigration	0.24	0.33**	0.20
<i>Populist right vs. Liberals</i>			
Welfare	0.15	0.09	0.11
Cultural liberalism	-0.10	-0.21	-0.42**
Army	0.07	-0.02	-0.16
European integration	-0.61**	-1.50***	-1.28***
Anti immigration	-0.02	0.04	0.09

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Regression coefficients from multinomial logistic regressions. The full results are presented in table A.5.

Swiss surveys. Citizens who support measures to defend or expand the welfare state are more likely to support the Social democrats, compared to the Liberals, than individuals who oppose such measures. These economic attitudes, however, have no impact on the choice between a party of the populist right and a liberal party. It is not voters' economic attitudes that explain choices within the larger group of right-wing parties. The central issue is here European integration. This separates the SVP and smaller right-wing populist parties from all of their competitors. Table 6 presents the corresponding coefficients only for the contrast with Liberal parties. But, in the 1990s, the impact of this issue is as strong, or even stronger, for the contrasts with the left or with the Christian democrats. At the same time, attitudes towards immigration have only a weak impact. The only significant effect we observe is for the contrast between the moderate left and right in 1995. On this point, the characteristics of SVP voters differ from those of the supporters of the Front National or of the List Pim Fortuyn. The most polarising issue on the cultural dimension is here not immigration, like in France or in the Netherlands, but the question of European integration. While immigration and asylum politics have played an important role in the 1999 campaign, the corresponding attitudes have only a weak impact on voting choices, when attitudes towards Europe are controlled for.¹⁰ Europe is the most central political issue for understanding the success of the SVP (Kriesi et

¹⁰ The impact of immigration becomes however more important when attitudes towards European integration are not included in the model.

al. 2005). The coefficients associated with this issue also show the importance of contrasting the populist right – which most clearly articulates the interests of the ‘losers’ of globalisation on the cultural dimension – with the moderate left-wing and right-wing parties, which do not present a strong divide on the questions of immigration or European integration.

Turning to the United Kingdom, coefficients for the contrasts between the three major parties can be found in table 7. Like in the other countries analysed so far, we find a strong economic opposition in all elections. Voters with more liberal economic attitudes are more likely to support the Liberal democrats, relative to Labour, and more likely to support the Conservatives, relative to Labour or to the Liberal Democrats. In virtually all cases, the impact of these economic orientations is the strongest one, on each one of the three contrasts. As far as cultural issues are concerned, the developments we observe are quite different from what we found in other countries. The issue of European integration had already a strong impact on voters’ preferences in 1974. More favourable attitudes towards European integration were linked with a higher probability to support the Conservatives, relative to the Liberal Democrats or to the Labour party. The impact of this issue category was then again weaker in 1992, but became more important in the course of the 1990s. Its impact on party choice, however, has reversed. The probability to support the Conservative party is now higher among voters with negative attitudes towards European integration. This reflects the fundamental change in the European policy of the two major parties, during the 1980s, as Labour changed from strong opposition to the EU to a pro-European position, while the Conservatives made the opposite change (Evans 1998). The politics of immigration, by contrast, do not have a strong impact on voters’ choices in recent elections.

In 1997 or 2001, thus, we find that economic issues and ‘new’ cultural issues are both central to explaining voting choices. While this fits with our hypothesis about the impact of globalisation, we have at the same time less evidence for a transformation of the cultural dimension. As we saw, Europe was already central to the 1974 election. Attitudes towards cultural liberalism have only a weak impact in the 1990s and early 2000s – but we cannot show whether this is really different from the 1970s, as we have no corresponding indicator for this first election.

Table 7. Regression coefficients for selected issues and contrasts, United Kingdom

	1974	1992	1997	2001
<i>Libdem vs. Labour</i>				
Economic liberalism	0.60***	0.66***	0.33***	0.35***
Cultural liberalism ¹		0.15	-0.07	0.00
European integration	0.65***	0.11	-0.26**	-0.04
Anti immigration			-0.05	-0.10
<i>Conservatives vs. Labour</i>				
Economic liberalism	1.25***	1.66***	0.82***	1.03***
Cultural liberalism		0.11	0.09	-0.42***
European integration	1.15***	-0.14	-0.45***	-0.58***
Anti immigration			0.04	0.06
<i>Conservatives vs. Libdem</i>				
Economic liberalism	0.65***	1.00***	0.49***	0.68***
Cultural liberalism		-0.05	0.16	-0.41**
European integration	0.50***	-0.25**	-0.19	-0.58***
Anti immigration			0.09	0.06

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Regression coefficients from multinomial logistic regressions. The full results are presented in table A.6.

¹ In 1997, 'traditional values'.

Table 8. Regression coefficients for selected issues and contrasts, Germany

	1976	1994	1998	2002
<i>SPD vs. Greens</i>				
Economic liberalism		-0.10	-0.02	-0.03
Cultural liberalism		0.27	0.60***	0.29
European integration			0.16	0.51**
Anti immigration		0.60*	0.82***	0.49*
<i>FDP vs. SPD</i>				
Economic liberalism	0.57**	0.57**	0.74***	-0.02
Cultural liberalism	0.09	-0.38	-0.17	0.25
European integration	0.06		-0.32	-0.17
Anti immigration		0.63*	-0.07	0.10
<i>CDU vs. SPD</i>				
Economic liberalism	0.92***	0.06	0.37***	0.13
Cultural liberalism	0.77***	0.08	0.41***	0.24*
European integration	0.12		0.01	0.05
Anti immigration		0.47***	0.29**	0.42***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Regression coefficients from multinomial logistic regressions. The full results are presented in table A.7.

Finally, we consider the evolution of the impact of issues in Germany.¹¹ Most striking about the results summarised in table 8 is probably the weakening of the economic cleavage. We expected to find in all countries a persistent economic divide between left-wing and right-wing parties. In Germany, however, this opposition appears to be surprisingly weak in the 1990s. The contrast between the major left-wing and right-wing parties, the SPD and the

¹¹ The analyses presented here for the 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections are limited to West German respondents.

CDU/CSU, is not influenced by attitudes towards economic liberalism in 1994 or 2002. Furthermore, while the corresponding coefficient is significant in 1998, its value points to a rather moderate effect, especially as compared to the results of other countries.¹² The traditional cultural cleavage has also weakened since the 1970s. Attitudes towards cultural liberalism and towards economic liberalism had a strong impact in 1976 on the choice between the major two parties. By 2002, however, none of these traditional divides seem to be relevant anymore.

At the same time, we observe that new cultural issues have become more salient. In recent elections, voting choices are affected by the cultural dimension only. Attitudes towards immigration have a strong impact on two of the contrasts presented here. A change in voters' preferences in favour of a more restrictive immigration policy increases their likelihood to support the CDU, relative to the SPD or to the FDP. The latter two parties take an intermediary position on this issue, between the CDU and the Greens, which attract the most liberal voters.

Conclusion

We have analysed here the impact of issues on voting choices in five European countries. Our aim was to see whether the consequences of globalisation at the level of national politics lead to a transformation of the determinants of voters' choices and to a reconfiguration of the main dimensions of party competition. The main assumption underlying this research is that globalisation is linked with new divergences, new oppositions at the national level. In this way, it should contribute to the creation of potential 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation. As their interests are articulated by political parties, new issues should be integrated in the existing ideological structure. This should first of all lead to a transformation of the cultural dimension that usually structured parties' positions and voters' choices. From a dimension based on traditional cultural issues (like moral or religious values) and on the issues emphasised by the new social movements of the 1970s (like the peace movement), it should increasingly be structured by attitudes towards European integration and towards immigration. This transformation process should bring new patterns of oppositions between left-wing and right-wing parties, as well as within these groups, between the moderate and radical or populist parties.

¹² Using attitudes towards the welfare state instead of economic liberalism do not lead to a different conclusion. These attitudes were measured in 1976 and 1994. The corresponding coefficients are always smaller than those associated with economic liberalism.

The analyses presented in this paper offer quite strong evidence supporting our hypotheses – though with a few important exceptions. The expected changes were most strongly confirmed in France and in the Netherlands. In these two countries, voting choices were structured in both elections by an economic and a cultural dimension. As far as the latter is concerned, however, the most important issues changed from cultural liberalism and national defence in the 1970s to immigration and European integration in the 1990s. The transformation was similar in Switzerland, although the traditional cultural cleavage was less pronounced in the 1970s. Attitudes towards European integration were already relevant at that time – though less strongly than in the 1990s. Another important difference regards which issue is most polarising on the cultural dimension: immigration in the Netherlands and in France, or Europe in the Swiss case. As far as Germany and the UK are concerned, our results were maybe more surprising. In Germany, contrary to all other countries, economic issues in the 1990s have lost most of their impact on voters’ choices. But we also observe here the expected transformation in the impact of cultural issues: the most polarising one was cultural liberalism in 1976, but immigration in the more recent elections. In the UK, finally, we could test this hypothesis only partially, as we have no indicators for the traditional cultural dimension in 1974. Altogether, while we find strong evidence for the expected transformation of the determinants of voters’ choices, some differences remain that would require more detailed analyses. As we have argued, the impact of globalisation depends on the mobilisation strategy of political parties, in particular of the populist right and of the radical left, which should most directly address the interests of the ‘losers’ of globalisation. Their strength, the issues they emphasise, and the segments of the electorate they try to mobilise should affect the character of the realignment process. The differences between France, Switzerland and the Netherlands, for example, can certainly be traced back to the priorities set by the FN, the SVP, and the LPF, respectively. It would thus be necessary to consider in more detail the positions and mobilisation strategy of the political parties with respect to globalisation and its consequences. This is one of the main directions in which we shall extend this research, by comparing systematically the supply and demand sides of electoral competition.

Appendix

Datasets

The datasets used here are available at the following institutions: France, Socio-Political Data Archive (www.cidsp.com/bdsp); Germany, Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (www.gesis.org/ZA); Netherlands, Steinmetz Archive (www.steinmetz-archieff.nl); Switzerland, Swiss information and data archive service for the social sciences (www.sidos.ch), UK, UK data archive (www.data-archive.ac.uk). Below, we indicate the title and reference number of the surveys we have analysed in this paper:

- France: Enquête post-électorale française, 1978 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0062), Enquête post-électorale française, 1988 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0601), Enquête post-électorale française, 2002 (Reference: BDSP-CIDSP q0891), Panel électoral français 2002.
- Germany: Wahlstudie 1976 (Panel) (ZA study number: 0823); Nachwahlstudie zur Bundestagswahl 1994 (ZA study number: 2601); Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998 (ZA study number: 3066); Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 2002 (ZA study number: 3861).
- Netherlands: Dutch parliamentary election study, 1972, 1973 (Reference: P0353); Dutch parliamentary election study, 1994 (P1208), Dutch parliamentary election study, 1998 (P1415); Dutch parliamentary election study, 2002-2003.
- Switzerland: Attitudes politiques 1975 (Reference: 20); Swiss electoral study 1995 (Reference: 1815); Swiss electoral study 1999 (Reference: 6646).
- UK: British Election Study, February 1974 (UKDA study number 359); British General Election Study, 1992 (UKDA study number 2981); British General Election Study, 1997 (UKDA study number 3887); British Election Panel Study, 2001 (UKDA study number 4620).

Coding of issue categories

Due to the amount of data used, it is not possible to give here detailed information on the operationalisation of the issue categories. For each survey and for each issue category, we simply indicate the name of the variables we have used.

- *France 1978*. Economic lib.: t27, t29, t30, t71. Welfare: t26. Budget: t28. Cultural lib.: t64, t73, t77, t87. Law and order: t74.
- *France 1988*. Economic lib.: q1a6, q4. Welfare: q31a2, q31a9. Trad. values: q2a1, q2a2, q2a3, q2a4. Cultural lib.: q1a4, q10, q31a6, q31a7, q31a8. Immigration: q1a9, q31a3. Army: q1a2. Law and order: q31a10.
- *France 1995*. Economic lib.: q20a2, q21a7, q21a12, q36. Cultural lib.: q7a3, q7a5, q7a7, q20a1, q22a1. Europe: q1, q21a16. Immigration: q7a1, q7a6. Law and order: q7a4.
- *France 2002*. Economic lib.: xq39_0, xq40, xq63_0. Cultural lib.: xq39_2, xq39_6, xq58, xq62_5, xq62_6, xq62_8. Trad. values: xq39_3, xq62_7, xq63_3, xq63_4. Europe: xq57, xq63_1. Immigration: xq39_1, xq39_5, xq62_1, xq62_4. Army: xq63_2. Law and order: xq39_4, xq62_9.
- *Germany 1976*. Economic lib.: v503. Welfare: v505. Cultural lib.: v504, v506, v518, v519. Europe: v324, v328. Culture: v326. Law and order: v327. Environment: v355.
- *Germany 1994*. Economic lib.: v39. Welfare: v100. Cultural lib.: v103, v104. Culture: v101. Immigration: v30, v41, v44, v45, v46, v47. Army: v40, v99. Law and order: v26, v98. Environment: v28, v38, v97.
- *Germany 1998*. Economic lib.: v177a, v350b. Cultural lib.: v176c, v350a, v350c. Europe: v174c. Immigration: v174b, v350l, v350n, v350r. Environment: v174a.

- *Germany 2002*. Economic lib.: v350b. Cultural lib.: v350a, v350c. Europe: v174c. Immigration: v174b, v350l, v350n, v350r. Environment: v174a.
- *Netherlands 1972*. Economic lib.: var124, var126, var376. Budget: var273. Cultural lib.: var120, var122. Europe: var116, var265. Immigration: var140, var141, var142. Army: var117, var266.
- *Netherlands 1994*. Economic lib.: var071. Cultural lib.: var061, var504, var505, var510, var512. Minorities: var081, var145, var471. Europe: var331. Immigration: var140, var141, var142, var143, var144, var146, var147, var148. Army: var508. Law and order: var066, var510. Environment: var076.
- *Netherlands 1998*. Economic lib.: v0123. Welfare: v0258, v0736. Cultural lib.: v0116, v0144, v0262, v0263, v0266, v0875, v0877, v0881, v0882. Europe: v0137. Immigration: v0130, v0876, v0878, v0880. Vote foreigners: v0759, v0760. Army: v0264. Law and order: v0265. Environment: v0259, v0743.
- *Netherlands 2002*. Economic lib.: v0215. Cultural lib.: v0209, v0882, v0894. Europe: v0889. Immigration: v0221. Law and order: v0227. Environment: v0875.
- *Switzerland 1975*. Economic lib.: v38. Welfare: v53, v65, v68, v80. Cultural lib.: v56, v83. Trad. values: v156, v157, v158, v159. Europe: v201. Culture: v62. Immigration: v77. Army: v155. Law and order: v74. Environment: v71.
- *Switzerland 1995*. Welfare: val2, val8. Cultural lib.: val5. Europe: val3. Immigration: val4. Army: val1. Law and order: val6. Environment: val7, val9.
- *Switzerland 1999*. Welfare: rp15420a, rp15480a. Cultural lib.: rp15450a, rp15500, rp15600. Europe: rp15430a. Immigration: rp15440a. Army: rp15410a. Law and order: rp15460a. Environment: rp15470a, rp15490a.
- *UK 1974*. Economic lib.: feb073, feb101. Welfare: feb080. Europe: feb056, feb058, feb066.
- *UK 1992*. Economic lib.: v43b, natprvst, v46a, v46b, v50i. Welfare: v43c, v44b, v44c, v44d, v47a, v50a. Budget: v44e. Cultural lib.: v47b, v50b, v50e. Trad. values: v50c, v50g, v50h. Europe: v27, v29a, v29b, v30a, v30b, v30c. Army: v31b. Law and order: v47d, v47e. Environment: v50d.
- *UK 1997*. Economic lib.: rprnat, natnlstn, tulaws, workrsay, rjbprc. Welfare: rtxspd, rinceq, taxspend, ridpovty, govnhssp, hlpprmed, redistrib. Budget: govodsp. Trad. values: rwhom2, eqopp2fr, racop2fr, abort2fr, homop2r. Nat. identity: govaid3w, natlearn, natcoop, natcitzn, natcrit. Europe: recind, eec, ecpolicy, ecuvievw. Culture: govodsp. Immigration: immbkasn. Army: defencut. Law and order: prisref, deathpen, stiftsent, lifmnlif. Environment: cartaxhi, carallow.
- *UK 2001*. Economic lib.: cq19c, cq19d. Welfare: cq19a. Cultural lib.: cq17d, cq19e, cq19f, cq19h, cq23a. Europe: cq14a. Immigration: cq16a, cq16b, cq16c, cq16d, cq16e. Law and order: cq15a, cq15b, cq15c, cq15d, cq23b. Environment: cq19k.

Regression tables

Table A.1. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, France 1978, 1988

	1978				1988				
	Radical left	Greens	UDF	RPR	Radical left	Greens	UDF	RPR	Populist right
Economic liberalism	-0.99** (0.10)	0.62** (0.20)	1.17** (0.09)	1.12** (0.09)	-0.48** (0.08)	0.26* (0.12)	0.64** (0.09)	0.56** (0.09)	0.34** (0.09)
Welfare	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.26 (0.15)	-0.18* (0.07)	-0.24** (0.07)	0.30* (0.13)	-0.41** (0.14)	-1.06** (0.09)	-1.10** (0.09)	-0.80** (0.10)
Budget	-0.01 (0.06)	0.11 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.07)	0 (0.07)					
Cultural liberalism	0.25** (0.08)	1.02** (0.19)	-0.52** (0.09)	-0.55** (0.09)	0.47** (0.10)	0.23 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.34** (0.10)	-0.11 (0.12)
Traditional values					0.04 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.15)	0.17 (0.09)	0.33** (0.08)	-0.1 (0.09)
Anti immigration					0.08 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.15)	0.41** (0.10)	0.32** (0.10)	1.51** (0.14)
Army					-0.32** (0.12)	-0.26 (0.16)	0.37** (0.08)	0.39** (0.08)	0.58** (0.09)
Law and order	0.06 (0.07)	0 (0.15)	0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.02 (0.14)	0.1 (0.09)	0.31** (0.09)	0.69** (0.13)
Constant	-0.87** (0.09)	-3.13** (0.23)	-0.71** (0.08)	-0.54** (0.08)	-1.89** (0.12)	-2.27** (0.14)	-1.11** (0.09)	-1.03** (0.09)	-2.00** (0.14)
N	1965				1998				
Log Likelihood	-2331.16				-2562.61				
R2 McFadden	0.18				0.2				

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'Social democrats'.

Table A.2. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, France 1995, 2002

	1995				2002				
	Radical left	Greens	RPR	Populist right	Radical left	Greens	UDF	RPR	Populist right
Economic liberalism	-0.25** (0.09)	0.25 (0.13)	1.04** (0.07)	0.80** (0.08)	0.1 (0.10)	0.40** (0.14)	1.33** (0.12)	0.97** (0.10)	0.76** (0.13)
Cultural liberalism	0.12 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.29** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.09)	0 (0.11)	0.81** (0.17)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.23 (0.16)
Traditional values					-0.30** (0.10)	-0.29* (0.15)	0.24* (0.12)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.12)
Europe	-0.61** (0.08)	-0.28* (0.14)	-0.25** (0.07)	-0.64** (0.08)	-0.47** (0.09)	-0.26 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)	0 (0.10)	-0.34** (0.12)
Anti immigration	-0.20* (0.09)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.27** (0.08)	1.08** (0.12)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.17)	0.21 (0.13)	1.36** (0.19)
Army					-0.04 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.12)	0.1 (0.12)	0.06 (0.09)	0.19 (0.12)
Law and order	0.06 (0.09)	-0.30* (0.15)	0.26** (0.07)	0.58** (0.10)	0.17 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.14)	0.13 (0.11)	0.52** (0.15)
Constant	-1.03** (0.09)	-2.06** (0.14)	0.39** (0.06)	-1.10** (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-1.56** (0.16)	-0.99** (0.13)	-0.03 (0.09)	-1.81** (0.19)
N	2251				1436				
Log Likelihood	-2612.78				-2040.08				
R2 McFadden	0.16				0.17				

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'Social democrats'.

Table A.3. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, Netherlands 1972, 1994

	1972				1994			
	GroenLinks	D66	CDA	VVD	GroenLinks	D66	CDA	VVD
Economic liberalism	-0.13 (0.13)	0.35* (0.17)	0.59** (0.09)	1.06** (0.11)	-0.41 (0.24)	0.54** (0.12)	0.63** (0.12)	1.23** (0.13)
Budget	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.10)				
Cultural liberalism	0.29** (0.11)	0 (0.16)	-0.41** (0.09)	-0.28** (0.11)	0.69** (0.22)	0.26* (0.12)	-0.81** (0.13)	-0.11 (0.13)
Minorities					0.33 (0.25)	-0.02 (0.14)	-0.45** (0.15)	-0.63** (0.16)
Europe	-0.35** (0.10)	-0.28 (0.15)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.59** (0.18)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)	0.27* (0.11)
Anti immigration	-0.42** (0.11)	0.06 (0.15)	0.25** (0.08)	0.17 (0.10)	-0.51* (0.23)	0.26 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.16)	0.31 (0.17)
Army	-0.19* (0.09)	0.22 (0.15)	0.69** (0.10)	0.85** (0.14)	0.02 (0.21)	0 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)	0.31** (0.12)
Law and order					0.2 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.12)	-0.23 (0.12)
Environment					0.1 (0.24)	0.13 (0.12)	-0.25* (0.11)	-0.39** (0.11)
Constant	-1.23** (0.14)	-1.64** (0.15)	0.22** (0.09)	-0.62** (0.11)	-2.70** (0.28)	-0.18 (0.11)	-0.29* (0.11)	-0.36** (0.12)
N	1201				969			
Log Likelihood	-1499.12				-1222.49			
R2 McFadden	0.14				0.17			

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'Social democrats'.

Table A.4. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, Netherlands 1998, 2002

	1998				2002				
	GroenLinks	D66	CDA	VVD	GroenLinks	D66	CDA	VVD	LPF
Economic liberalism	-0.15 (0.15)	0.46** (0.13)	0.41** (0.10)	0.93** (0.11)	-0.18 (0.13)	0.33* (0.15)	0.30** (0.10)	1.03** (0.12)	0.56** (0.13)
Welfare	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.25* (0.10)	-0.70** (0.11)					
Cultural liberalism	0.62** (0.15)	0.59** (0.14)	-1.09** (0.13)	0.03 (0.13)	0.39** (0.13)	0.13 (0.15)	-0.62** (0.11)	0 (0.13)	-0.21 (0.15)
Europe	-0.2 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)	0.18 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.22 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.35** (0.12)
Anti immigration	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.12)	0.37** (0.12)	0.04 (0.14)	0.36* (0.16)	0.44** (0.12)	0.76** (0.14)	1.69** (0.17)
Vote foreigners	0.07 (0.13)	0.27* (0.12)	0.29** (0.10)	0.38** (0.10)					
Army	0 (0.13)	0.1 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)					
Law and order	0.07 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.23* (0.10)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.25* (0.10)	0.51** (0.13)	0.60** (0.16)
Environment	0.52** (0.15)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.25* (0.10)	-0.49** (0.10)	0.35* (0.16)	-0.39** (0.14)	-0.56** (0.10)	-0.79** (0.12)	-0.53** (0.13)
Constant	-1.65** (0.15)	-1.07** (0.12)	-0.73** (0.11)	-0.66** (0.11)	-0.95** (0.17)	-0.85** (0.15)	0.75** (0.10)	-0.24 (0.13)	-0.80** (0.16)
N	1179				1201				
Log Likelihood	-1472.41				-1677.52				
R2 McFadden	0.18				0.17				

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'Social democrats'.

Table A.5. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, Switzerland 1975–1999

	1975			1995			1999				
	CVP	Liberals	SVP	Greens	CVP	Liberlas	Populist right	Greens	CVP	Liberals	Populist right
Economic liberalism	0.17 (0.13)	0.51** (0.16)	0.34 (0.20)								
Welfare	-0.58** (0.17)	-0.77** (0.18)	-0.61** (0.23)	-0.40* (0.19)	-0.77** (0.13)	-1.04** (0.13)	-0.95** (0.14)	-0.27 (0.23)	-0.52** (0.14)	-1.18** (0.13)	-1.07** (0.15)
Cultural liberalism	0.12 (0.15)	0.18 (0.17)	0.08 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.23 (0.16)	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.31* (0.14)	-0.30* (0.13)	-0.72** (0.16)
Traditional values	0.60** (0.15)	0.40* (0.17)	0.54* (0.26)								
Europe	0.09 (0.14)	0.34* (0.15)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.35 (0.22)	-0.52** (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)	-1.51** (0.16)	-0.37 (0.28)	-0.39** (0.15)	-0.26 (0.15)	-1.54** (0.16)
Culture	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.24)								
Anti immigration	-0.1 (0.15)	0.24 (0.17)	0.21 (0.21)	-0.45 (0.23)	0.19 (0.13)	0.33** (0.12)	0.36** (0.14)	-0.17 (0.26)	0.11 (0.13)	0.2 (0.13)	0.29* (0.14)
Army	0.09 (0.15)	0.22 (0.18)	0.29 (0.24)	-0.42* (0.21)	0.50** (0.14)	0.83** (0.14)	0.81** (0.16)	-0.46 (0.24)	0.58** (0.14)	0.30* (0.13)	0.15 (0.15)
Law and order	-0.15 (0.13)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.2 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.16)	0.12 (0.12)	0.27* (0.12)	0.14 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.20)	0.43** (0.13)	0.27* (0.12)	0.09 (0.14)
Environment	-0.08 (0.14)	0.06 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.20)	0.64** (0.23)	-0.25* (0.12)	-0.42** (0.12)	-0.55** (0.13)	0.84** (0.29)	-0.24 (0.13)	-0.34** (0.12)	-0.43** (0.14)
Constant	0.22 (0.13)	-0.28 (0.15)	-1.23** (0.21)	-2.40** (0.29)	-0.27* (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.89** (0.16)	-2.47** (0.35)	0.04 (0.14)	0.30* (0.13)	-0.12 (0.15)
N	431			951			969				
Log Likelihood	-509.75			-1054.54			-1055.58				
R2 McFadden	0.09			0.26			0.26				

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'Social democrats'.

Table A.6. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, United Kingdom 1974–2001

	1974		1992		1997		2002	
	Conserv.	Libdem	Conserv.	Libdem	Conserv.	Libdem	Conserv.	Libdem
Economic liberalism	1.25** (0.10)	0.60** (0.09)	1.66** (0.12)	0.66** (0.12)	0.81** (0.09)	0.30** (0.09)	1.03** (0.10)	0.35** (0.09)
Welfare	-0.47** (0.08)	-0.16 (0.08)	-1.26** (0.13)	-0.67** (0.13)	-1.20** (0.11)	-0.37** (0.11)	0.02 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)
Budget			-0.06 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)		
Cultural liberalism			0.11 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)			-0.42** (0.11)	0 (0.10)
Traditional values			-0.11 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	0 (0.08)		
National identity					0.33** (0.10)	-0.23* (0.09)		
Europe	1.15** (0.09)	0.65** (0.09)	-0.14 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)	-0.47** (0.09)	-0.35** (0.09)	-0.58** (0.11)	-0.04 (0.09)
Anti immigration					0.06 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.1 (0.11)
Army			0.32** (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.21** (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)		
Law and order			-0.07 (0.09)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.16 (0.09)	-0.31** (0.08)	0.2 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)
Environment			-0.27** (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.1 (0.08)	0.22* (0.10)	0.24* (0.10)
Constant	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.32** (0.09)	0.26** (0.09)	-0.30** (0.09)	-0.92** (0.08)	-0.96** (0.08)	-0.92** (0.10)	-0.78** (0.09)
N	1289		1572		1571		995	
Log Likelihood	-1063.77		-1124.4		-1221.83		-888.65	
R2 McFadden	0.22		0.31		0.23		0.14	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'Labour'.

Table A.7. Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the models of voting choice, Germany 1976–2002

	1976		1994			1998			2002		
	CDU	FDP	CDU	FDP	Greens	CDU	FDP	Greens	CDU	Greens	FDP
Economic liberalism	0.92** (0.11)	0.57** (0.17)	0.06 (0.10)	0.57** (0.20)	0.1 (0.17)	0.37** (0.09)	0.74** (0.19)	0.02 (0.15)	0.13 (0.10)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.18)
Welfare	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.1 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.24 (0.22)	0.28 (0.20)						
Cultural liberalism	0.77** (0.11)	0.09 (0.17)	0.08 (0.12)	-0.38 (0.24)	-0.27 (0.21)	0.41** (0.11)	-0.17 (0.20)	-0.60** (0.16)	0.24* (0.11)	-0.29 (0.15)	0.25 (0.20)
Europe	0.12 (0.11)	0.06 (0.18)				0.01 (0.09)	-0.32 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.16)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.51** (0.17)	-0.17 (0.19)
Culture	0 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.23)	-0.37 (0.21)						
Anti immigration			0.47** (0.12)	0.63* (0.26)	-0.60* (0.24)	0.29** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.82** (0.22)	0.42** (0.11)	-0.49* (0.21)	0.1 (0.21)
Army			0.36** (0.11)	0.37 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.20)						
Law and order	0.27* (0.11)	-0.2 (0.14)	0.1 (0.12)	0.16 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.18)						
Environment	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.15)	0.32** (0.12)	0.58* (0.24)	-1.54** (0.28)	0.33** (0.09)	0.43* (0.19)	-0.85** (0.19)	0.79** (0.11)	-0.25 (0.17)	0.42* (0.19)
Constant	-0.09 (0.10)	-1.62** (0.16)	-0.26* (0.10)	-2.63** (0.28)	-2.89** (0.32)	-0.40** (0.09)	-2.64** (0.23)	-2.59** (0.24)	0.1 (0.09)	-1.93** (0.21)	-1.78** (0.17)
N	667		570			731			676		
Log Likelihood	-516.79		-521.55			-690.67			-659.55		
R2 McFadden	0.16		0.19			0.16			0.14		

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Models estimated with multinomial logistic regressions. The reference category is 'SPD'.

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